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INTRODUCTION
Liberalism and multicultural constitutionalism are on a colli-
sion course destined to become the next great battlefield in the
unfolding odyssey of American constitutional law.' The impend-
ing battle will define the scope and limits of liberal
1. The clash between liberalism and multiculturalism promises to define this bat-
tlefield well into the twenty-first century. Liberal political theory differs from non-lib-
eral theories by insisting on a sharp distinction between the public and the private,
or more specifically, between the political and the non-political. According to this
conception of liberalism, politics should be limited in order to create an arena in
which individual liberty can flourish. Multiculturalism recognizes the existence of a
plurality of equally plausible cultural values. At first glance, liberalism and
multiculturalism seem to be compatible because liberalism's non-political domain ap-
pears to be ready-made for accommodating a plurality of different cultural commit-
ments. Problems arise, however, when a minority culture's deep structure is incom-
patible with liberalism's methods of resolving cultural conflicts. For example, liberal-
ism often conflicts with religions holding non-deliberative values. Any religious culture
based on faith has a deep structure incompatible with liberalism.
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constitutionalism and its role as the model for democracy
around the world.2 While turbulence between liberalism and
multicultural constitutionalism occurs across a panoply of con-
troversies, the eye of the storm focuses on one central question:
Can liberalism tolerate non-liberal cultures?3 This article ex-
plores the hypothesis that liberalism's deep structure precludes
it from explaining and justifying the toleration of non-liberal
cultures. If so, this hypothesis has serious implications concern-
ing the viability of liberal multicultural constitutionalism.4 Ei-
ther liberalism must be radically reconceived or abandoned, or
we must revise our conviction that multicultural constitu-
tionalism is normatively desirable.5
2. The role of liberal constitutionalism as a model for emerging democracies is
complex and contestable with no guarantee of yielding the same results in different
cultural contexts. For example, rights might be a component of liberal
constitutionalism in some cultures while not in others. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay
on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (1984) (arguing that if critiques of law are
culture-bound, "there is nothing odd about saying that rights in Poland are a good
thing, while rights in the United States are not. They are, after all, different cul-
tures.").
3. This question involves at least three additional questions: First, how rich is
liberalism's conception of tolerance? Second, in what sense does liberalism appreciate
or respect alternative cultures? Lastly, what ontological and political commitments fol-
low from the concept of a cultural or group right? This last issue focuses on whether
the basic normative concepts of a political theory, such as rights, can apply to groups
the same way that it does to individuals. See Robert Justin Lipkin, In Defense of
Outlaws: Liberalism and The Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason, and Tolerance in
Multicultural Constitutionalism 45 DEPAUL L. REV. (Forthcoming 1996). The contro-
versy over cultural rights implicates the controversy between communitarianism and
liberalism. See COMMtUNITAiANiSM AND INDIVIDUALISM (Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-
Shalit eds., 1992); see also Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985).
4. Liberal multiculturalism attempts to resolve the problems of multiculturalism
by appealing to autonomy, rationality, equality, and other distinctly liberal values. In
a given society, both majority and minority cultures might reflect these values albeit
in different ways. If so, the minority culture represents an alternative liberal culture.
On the other hand, a minority culture might be a non-liberal culture. Consequently,
multiculturalism can be understood in a stronger and weaker sense. The weak sense
urges responsiveness and sensitivity to other deliberative cultures. The strong sense
counsels toleration of nondeliberative cultures.
5. Except where the context indicates otherwise, I use "multiculturalism" and
"multicultural constitutionalism" interchangeably. There are useful distinctions be-
tween these terms as well as between the terms multiculturalism, multi-national, and
multi-ethnic. For an interesting discussion of these distinctions in the context of cul-
tural pluralism, see WILL KYMCKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A THEORY OF MI-
NORITY RIGHTS 10-26 (1995).
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Multicultural constitutionalism appears desirable for two
reasons. First, the demographics of the United States are un-
dergoing a sea change. Early in the next millennium, the Unit-
ed States will cease being a predominantly caucasian nation
with a European heritage. This presents the extraordinary
challenge of integrating, fairly and justly, newly arriving cul-
tures with traditional ones.6 Multicultural constitutionalism
promises a framework for integrating the new with the old. In
particular, it promises a resolution of the cultural warfare over
education, the arts, religion, and law in American society.7
Second, multicultural constitutionalism presents special oppor-
tunities for liberalism as a model for constructing democratic
institutions in societies recently emerging from the iron rule of
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe and elsewhere.' Because these multicultural societies
often see liberal democracy as a beacon of hope for creating a
just society, the question of liberal multicultural
constitutionalism assumes great urgency. As we continue to ob-
serve in Bosnia-Herzegovina, cultural warfare can be cata-
6. It can be argued that the American experience was born out of a clash of
cultures, and the historical record does not portray the current dominant culture in
an excessively favorable light. Recall the horrors of slavery, sexism, and the treat-
ment of Native Americans.
One can question the idea of a "dominant" culture. Instead, it can be argued
that the dominant culture was actually a compilation of different cultures. Neverthe-
less, the notion of a "dominant" culture retains explanatory value. Today the domi-
nant culture is threatened by an avalanche of disparate cultures, or so the defenders
of the dominant culture contend.
7. Multicultural issues arise in the context of the "culture wars" which seek to
determine the future direction of American society concerning such issues as affirma-
tive action, political correctness and the appropriate canon in education. See J.
DAVISON, CULTURE WARS (1992); see also Robert Justin Lipkin, Pragmatism, Cultural
Criticism, and The Idea of the Postmodern University, in AN ETHICAL EDUCATION:
COMMUNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE MULTICULTURAL UNIVERSITY 49 (M.N.S. Sellers ed.,
1994). The critical question for American liberalism is whether it can integrate alien
cultures without eviscerating them.
8. Multiculturalism can be understood in at least one of two ways. The first
conception argues that cultural factors must be included in political justification be-
cause these factors represent the values of individuals. This instrumental and reduc-
tionist conception of multiculturalism is compatible with a liberal justification of
multicultural values. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE
182-205 (1989). The second conception of multiculturalism regards cultures as in-
trinsically valuable, arguing, at least in principle, that in the context of justification
cultural factors are morally and ontologically basic (along with individualistic factors).
Of course, it is not obvious what such a view involves.
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strophic and deadly. Consequently, several critical questions
arise: Can liberal constitutionalism resolve these costly conflicts
by recognizing the cultural identity of disparate cultural and
ethnic groups?9 Is it possible to integrate liberalism and
multiculturalism into a coherent conception of constitu-
tionalism? Additionally, should we be sanguine about the future
of liberal revolutions, or are the conceptual and moral resources
of liberalism irremediably impoverished?' ° If the latter, do al-
ternatives exist that might better resolve the imminent consti-
tutional and cultural battles?
Our search for a liberal conception of tolerance also impli-
cates a host of doctrinal questions about the appropriate evolu-
tion of American law: Should a defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion be permitted to invoke the "culture defense" to excuse or
justify conduct that is criminal in the United States?1 Is it
permissible or desirable for languages other than English to be
used in public education or in public forums such as courts and
legislatures?' Is it possible for minority cultures to receive
9. The Canadian federation is an attempt constitutionally to recognize two differ-
ent cultural groups: English and French. Recent events in Canadian constitutional
affairs should make one less than sanguine in estimating Canada's chance to remain
unified. See William R. Lederman, Canadian Constitutional Amending Procedures:
1867-1982, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 339, 346 (1984). For an interesting philosophical treat-
ment of the argument for secession, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY
OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991). Last
October, separatists were narrowly defeated in their attempt to create an independent
Quebec.
10. Bruce Ackerman enthusiastically believes that political liberalism has a good
chance to bring about the best future for humankind. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1991); Bruce Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, 91 J.
PHIL. 364 (1994). It is not obvious that Ackerman's optimism can survive the objec-
tion that liberal tolerance founders on the distinction between deliberative and dedi-
cated cultures.
11. The culture defense insists that a person should not be convicted of a crime,
or that the sentence should be at least mitigated, if her former culture required or
encouraged the conduct in question. See Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cul-
tural Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the
Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991); Note, The Cultural Defense in the
Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986).
12. Canada provides a useful case study of multicultural conflict in a liberal de-
mocracy. Canada is constitutionally a bilingual country with both English and French
recognized as the two official languages of the Canadian federation. Canada has faced
problems of liberal multiculturalism and group democracy from its inception, perhaps
because the Quebecquois and other Canadians do not share a univocal conception of
self-government. Charles Taylor, Shared and Divergent Values, in OPTIONS FOR A NEW
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special recognition or, in the limiting case, should their mem-
bers be permitted to secede if their cultural aspirations cannot
be met by the dominant culture in the United States? 3 Should
prayer and expressions of minority cultural values be permitted
in public schools? Can liberal multicultural constitutionalism,
even in special circumstances, tolerate public school districts
run exclusively according to the dictates of a particular reli-
gion? 4 Do general proscriptions against animal sacrifice con-
flict with religious freedom? 5 How should we have resolved
the classic confrontation between church and state that ended
the Mormon practice of polygamy?" Finally, how should Amer-
CANADA 53 (Ronald L. Watts & Douglas M. Brown eds., 1991).
At one point Quebec passed a law that forbade commercial signs from being
written in any language other than French. Before it was repealed the Canadian
Supreme Court held that Quebec was warranted in adopting the measure to assure
the "predominance of the French language" in Quebec. Ford v. Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 712,
778 (1988), quoted in P. MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE: THE INSIDE STORY (1991).
13. Secession became an ominous possibility in Canada during the late 1970s.
Lederman, supra note 9, at 346 ("The urgency about basic constitutional matters in
the later 1970s arose from the fact that the Parti Quebecquois achieved power as the
Provincial Government of Quebec in 1976, with the declared objective of eventually
bringing about the secession of Quebec from the Canadian Federal Union."). In rare
circumstances, a right to secede may be justified on the grounds of preserving one's
culture. Consequently, it can be argued that Quebec is justified in seceding if the
perpetuation of Francophone culture requires state protection. See BUCHANAN, supra
note 9, at 63-64, 153, 161. But see Will Kymlicka, Book Review, 20 POL. THEORY 527,
531-32 (1992) (charging that Buchanan's argument implies unjustifiably that the bur-
den of proof concerning the propriety of succession falls on the secessionists).
The Meech Lake Accord was a recent attempt to save the Canadian Federal
Union from disintegration essentially by recognizing that "Quebec constitutes within
Canada a distinct society." PETER W. HOGG, MEECH LAKE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD
ANNOTATED § (2)(1)(b) (1988). Similarly, the Charlottetown Accord gave Native Cana-
dians a greater role in self-government. The Charlottetown Accord, at least indirectly,
also addresses the problem of group democracy as it pertains to other groups of Ca-
nadians. See Errol P. Mendes, The Charlottestown Accord: Sinking Again into the
Quagmire of Conflicting Visions, Groups, Underinclusion and Death by Referendum, 2
N.J.C.L. 379 (1991). Both accords failed ratification.
14. Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (invalidating the creation of a
school district based on religious criteria).
15. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993)
(invalidating a law designed to prohibit animal sacrifice).
16. One great American religion, Mormonism, altered its fundamental principles
partly as a result of the hostility toward the practice of polygamy. Today, in the
Southwest, thousands of descendants of Mormons still practice polygamy as part of
their religion. One can understand, perhaps, why Judaism, Catholicism and Protes-
tantism forbid polygamy. Can it seriously be argued today, however, that liberalism
need not tolerate polygamy as a fundamental part of some people's conception of the
good? Can it seriously be argued that polygamy is "in violation of social duties or
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ican constitutionalism respond to the sanctified role land plays
in Native American culture? Can liberal toleration constitution-
ally honor the Native American conviction that land has a spir-
itual meaning beyond that attributed to it by mainstream
American culture?'
This article is part of a larger project which attempts to
answer these and other questions about liberal multicultural
constitutionalism. For present purposes I explore one reason for
being skeptical about the possibility of liberal multicultural
constitutionalism. The article introduces a distinction between
deliberative and dedicated cultures in light of which we can re-
evaluate the possibility of liberal multicultural constitu-
tionalism." Although this distinction tracks such familiar dis-
tinctions as reason and tradition, freedom and custom, reason
and religion, needs and desires, democracy and authority, open
and closed societies, and so forth, it is in fact identical to none
of them. 9 It must, instead, be recognized as an independent
subversive of good order." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). Which
good order? Gender equality places constraints on polygamy, that is, society must
permit both polygyny and polyandry. But what possible argument in terms of autono-
my, rationality and equality require monogamy? To be sure, a polygamous society
might differ from or be more complex than ours, but for liberalism, neither reason is
conclusive. Liberalism should foster ingenuity and experimentation in accommodating
as many conceptions of the good as possible. This is untrue in American society,
where marriage rights are skewed in an illiberal fashion. See Will Kymlicka, Rethink-
ing the Family, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 77, 92 n.1 (1991).
17. Will Kymlicka argues that liberalism can accommodate the cultural values
concerning land of indigenous people-because in some cases choice requires special
constitutional protection of minority cultures. KYMLICKA, supra note 8.
18. My use of liberalism assumes that virtually all political players on the Ameri-
can scene-whether conservative, centrist, or radical-are liberals. As Alasdair
MacIntyre asserts: "[Tihe contemporary debates within modern political systems are
almost exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals."
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHOSE RATIONALITY? 392 (1988); see Larry
Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Liberalism, Neutrality, and Equality of Welfare
vs. Equal Resources, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85, 86 (1987) (distinguishing between
right-liberals and left-liberals).
19. Sir Isaiah Berlin provides a framework for characterizing these familiar dis-
tinctions in his description of the political battles of the eighteenth and nineteenth
century. Sir Isaiah vrites:
On one side stood the supporters of tradition, of political and social hier-
archies, whether 'natural' or hallowed by history, or belief in, and obedi-
ence to, divine, or at any rate transcendent authority. These were men
who believed that the operations of untrammeled reason must be kept
within bounds and should, above all, be prevented from questioning the
validity of the laws and customs of ancient ways of life-those impalpa-
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conceptual device for characterizing problems of liberalism and
multiculturalism. The article deploys this distinction to show
that the liberal conception of tolerance is more doctrinaire than
usually thought, and therefore cannot provide a basis for
multicultural constitutionalism. Instead, the possibility of
multicultural constitutionalism depends upon an alternative
conception of tolerance. °
I do not deny that given present political conditions, liberal
political theory can usually explain and justify why one liberal
culture tolerates another.2 However, liberal political theory
can explain and justify toleration22 of non-liberal cultures only
in the following circumstances: when non-liberal cultures are
sufficiently like liberal cultures so as to avoid deadly conflict or
when the liberal culture derives instrumental benefits in toler-
ating the non-liberal culture.23 When an intractable conflict ex-
ists between a liberal culture and a non-liberal culture, liberal
political theory cannot explain and justify tolerance. Indeed, the
history of liberalism is replete with examples of liberal intoler-
ance of non-liberal cultures and regimes.24 Understanding lib-
ble and analyzable bonds that hold society together and alone preserve
the moral healthy of states and individuals. This is the faith in the
'integral' community which critical examination by skeptical intellectuals,
using rationalist methods, can only discredit in theory and undermine,
and in the end disintegrate, in practice. On the other side stood the
unswerving champions of reason, who rejected faith in tradition, intuition,
transcendent sources of authority as mere smoke-screens to justify irratio-
nality, ignorance, bias, fear of the truth in the matters of theory, and
stupidity, injustice, oppression....
ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 254-55 (1991).
20. I examine the possibilities of a pragmatic conception of multicultural
constitutionalism in Lipkin, supra note 3.
21. This ought not to be viewed as a foregone conclusion. A liberal culture might
find another liberal culture intolerable if the latter's substantive values are vastly
different.
22. In distinguishing different kinds of tolerance, I do not explore the differences
in the meaning of "tolerance" and "toleration." Throughout the article, I use these
terms interchangeably.
23. A good example of this is Rawls' attempt to show how liberalism can tolerate
non-liberal, well-ordered societies. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 41 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). I critically examine Rawls'
argument in Lipkin, supra note 3.
24. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, 12
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 213 (1983) ("Even though liberal states have become involved
in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet
to engage in war with one another.") (emphasis in original); see also Michael W.
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eral theory's incapacity to tolerate non-liberal cultures reveals a
salient feature of liberalism's deep structure: liberalism depends
upon the deliberative attitude, a specific strategy for living
antithetical to nondeliberative, or dedicated forms of life.25
This deep structure implies criteria for evaluating the legitima-
cy of cultural and political regimes. The deliberative attitude,
designed to solve both individual and collective practical prob-
lems, seeks to evaluate rationally all cultural constructs in
order to determine which are legitimate and which need to be
revised or abandoned.
The deliberative attitude is a way of viewing the world,26
and includes a general approach to problem solving. As such
the deliberative attitude cannot appreciate or make intelligible
to itself, cultures and regimes whose values are inaccessible to
deliberation. Liberalism grounds such virtues as liberty, equali-
ty, privacy, and the rule of law in the deliberative attitude.27
Unless other grounds are possible, these virtues must then be
antithetical, conceptually and morally, to nondeliberative atti-
tudes. Thus, liberalism faces this dilemma: either it can explain
and justify liberal toleration of non-liberal cultures or it cannot.
If it can explain and justify liberal toleration of non-liberal cul-
tures, it does so at the expense of the deliberative attitude, its
primary structural feature. If it cannot explain and justify liber-
al tolerance of non-liberal cultures, it fails in one of its central
purposes, allowing diversity and pluralism.28 Consequently,
Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323,
337 (1993) "[Liberalism does appear to exacerbate intervention against weak non-
liberal societies and hostility against powerful non-liberal societies.").
25. Liberals tend to characterize liberalism in terms of rationality, autonomy, and
equality. These values typically depend upon practical reasoning and deliberation as
the primary forms of cultural inquiry.
26. Liberalism can be regarded as a comprehensive theory of society, not just a
theory of politics. As a theory of society, it includes a political theory, a legal theory,
a moral theory and a theory of moral motivation. Each theory is grounded in and
connected to one another through the deliberative attitude.
27. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC & PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 116-17
n.1 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).
28. The dilemma of liberal toleration is expressed by what Jean Hampton calls
the "paradox of liberalism." Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy and Metaphysics, 99
ETmIcs 791, 803 (1983). This paradox focuses on the problem of integrating tolerance
and partiality into one political conception. At first glance, "[i]t would seem that a
liberal, to be consistent, would have to tolerate even those who would challenge (and
use violence to attack) that principle, so that, to paraphrase Robert Frost, the liberal
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liberalism either betrays its structure or abandons tolerance."
Liberalism can avoid one horn of this dilemma only by being
impaled on the other."0
Part One of this article explains the distinction between
deliberative and dedicated cultures. Deliberative cultures advo-
cate resolving the problems of cultural conflict and change by
appealing to the values of rationality and autonomy, while
dedicated cultures resolve these problems by appealing to the
values of constancy and closure." In Part Two, I suggest that
although certain familiar distinctions are relevant to the dis-
tinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures, none are
identical to it and none offer a systematic understanding of the
differences between liberal and non-liberal societies. In fact, the
distinction between deliberative and dedicated constructs repre-
sents a unique distinction between two different perspectives, or
ways of being in the world. In Part Three, the article examines
the question of whether liberalism includes a conception of the
good, and how the distinction between deliberative and dedicat-
ed cultures is relevant to the conception of the good. Finally,
could not take his own side in this argument." Id. (citing Nagel, Moral Conflicts and
Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (1987)).
29. Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, in THERE's No SUCH THING AS FREE
SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING Too 135, 138 (1994).
30. Thus, this article casts doubt on liberalism's genuine capacity to tolerate di-
versity. For some liberals, skepticism concerning moral truth or proof underlies
liberalism's toleration of diversity, not an appreciation and respect for diverse ways of
human flourishing. This has special force in the context of international relations. As
Charles Beitz puts it: "[Tihe most that can be said about the relations among com-
munities is that they should be based on a principle of tolerance of diversity-not
because diversity has some special, non-local, value but because there can be no basis
for imposing any other requirements." Charles Beitz, Sovereignty and Morality, in
POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 236, 251 (1991). But doesn't this just mean that there can
be no other liberal basis for tolerating diversity? Granting this does not preclude
other non-liberal conceptions of diversity. It should be noted that early liberal propo-
nents of toleration based their arguments in religion. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER ON
TOLERATION (1968).
31. This is not necessarily the manner in which loyal members of a dedicated cul-
ture would describe their culture. In fact, it is likely that they would regard their
culture as that constituting the supreme truth or highest good. From our external
viewpoint, we may not agree to such characterizations. Nevertheless, we can say that
dedicated cultures embrace the value of predictability in resolving cultural and moral
conflicts and therefore are committed to some institutional device for putting an end
to debate, if they permit debate at all. The values of constancy and closure drive
certain conceptions of politics and law. Burkean incrementalism is an example of the
former, while positivism illustrates the latter.
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Part Three explores the role that the distinction between de-
liberative and dedicated cultures plays in demonstrating liberal-
ism's inability to explain and justify toleration of non-liberal
cultures.32
I. DELIBERATIVE AND DEDICATED CONSTRUCTS
A. Universal Rationality and Particularist Rationality
Deliberative inquiry, or "deliberativism," is committed to
rationality as the chief mechanism for evaluation and practical
reasoning.33 Deliberative constructs include, inter alia, con-
cepts, values, attitudes, judgments, beliefs and desires, and
generally anything that can be evaluated rationally.
Deliberativism is a problem-solving strategy, designed to evalu-
ate the legitimacy or reliability of any system of beliefs and
values, including cultural systems.'
Two forms of rationality deserve special mention: universal
rationality and particularist rationality. Universal rationality
contends that general principles exist that apply to everyone
and that in principle are acceptable to everyone.35 These prin-
ciples are neutral or impartial with respect to the good life, and
therefore can function as arbiters of conflicts between different
conceptions of the good. Universal rationality is a modernist
conception designed to provide a foundation or irrepressible
explanation and justification of our system of beliefs and val-
ues, including our conception of the good.3" Typically, such a
32. Saying that liberalism cannot explain and justifr liberal toleration of non-
liberal cultures means that liberalism cannot tolerate non-liberal systems of norms
and values.
33. Both practical reasoning and practical autonomy are central to the ideal of
deliberativism.
34. I do not wish to stress the term "system" in foundationalist or rationalist
terms. A cultural system is a body of beliefs and values partially integrated, partially
coherent, but having a certain character and some experiential cohesion.
35. Typically, universal rationality in politics claims "a privileged, or an
extrahistorical and procedurally guaranteed, access to the content of the overall social
good...." John Dunn, Reconceiving the Content and Character of Modern Political
Community, in INTERPRETING POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 210 (1990).
36. MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 6 (arguing that the Enlightenment strove "to
provide for debate in the public realm standards and methods of rational justification
by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of life could be judged just or
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foundation reflects, or is inescapably connected, to reality or to
human reason in the sense that a refusal to be bound by its
dictates is a sine qua non of irrationality. Universal rationality
is necessary for the intelligibility and efficacy of argument and
proof, and provides the tools necessary to resolve cultural con-
flicts.37
Universal rationality purports to be politically and morally
neutral. Winning an argument requires a formal exercise in
reason, but does not require, and indeed precludes, an appeal to
substantive moral or political values. Similarly, universal ratio-
nality is the process through which we resolve our cultural
wars. In these wars, universal rationality determines which
culture or cultural provision is correct and therefore which
should be defended. Universal rationality thus is a means for
discovering cultural legitimacy.
Critics point out that any universal conception of reason will
be too thin for arbitrating conflicts between different concep-
tions of the good or between antagonistic cultures." Instead,
"we must inevitably refer to values on which there may per-
haps be a consensus within a particular community, but about
which there is no prospect of achieving universal agreement by
appeal to considerations of rationality alone."39 According to
this view, universal rationality is itself based on local values."
unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or unenlightened."). For an instructive re-
view of MacIntyre's book, see Brian Barry, The Light that Failed, 100 ETHICS 160
(1989) (book review). See also Julia Annas, MacIntyre on Traditions, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 388 (1989) (book review).
37. This conception of the role of universal rationality is my characterization of
the relevance of such philosophers as Plato and Kant to cultural inquiry.
38. MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD
(1994).
39. Beitz, supra note 30, at 250-51.
40. In the context of discovery, rationality is certainly local, although proponents
of universal rationality rarely identify it as such. What then warrants universal val-
ues in the context of justification? Unless its proponents can demonstrate a concep-
tion of rational justification free of cultural factors, their hope of establishing univer-
sal rationality is misguided. No philosophical attempt to do this has ever been suc-
cessful. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New
Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 811 (1990) (arguing against the possibility of conceptions like universal rationali-
ty). Universal rationality is not a ground for a novel cultural proposition. Rather, it
is an aspiration, a proposal to the reflective cultural community or communities to
consider, evaluate and endorse a new cultural imperative as having a wide scope.
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Consequently, the notion of universal reason is incoherent be-
cause it depends on local attitudes and therefore cannot be
used to evaluate these attitudes.
By contrast, particularist rationality is antifoundationalist
and denies that nontrivial universal principles exist for adjudi-
cating our cultural wars.41 Particularists may concede that at
some level of generality, universal moral and political judg-
ments are true. However, they regard this as a conceptual or
linguistic point, not an ontological one. If we define murder as
unjustified and unexcused homicide, then murder is always
wrong in every cultural context. The problem here is that with-
out universal normative rules for determining when a homicide
is unjustified or unexcused, this result is entirely trivial. Abor-
tion, euthanasia, and the death penalty result in taking human
life, but they count as murders only when they are unjustified
and unexcused according to the appropriate normative rules.
Thus, murder can be described as universally wrong only in the
trivial sense that when a homicide is unjustified and unexcused
it is murder. This is a trivial result because we still do not
know how this bears on concrete controversies over the moral
propriety of such homicides. Our cultural debates concerning
these homicides founders on our inability to construct norma-
tive rules objectively or universally tying the homicide to justifi-
cation and excuse. The fact that murder is universally wrong in
this linguistic sense is a trivial victory for universalists. If no
more robust conception of universality is possible, universal
rationality adds little to particularist argument and proof.
Deliberation embraces a process of critically evaluating social
conflicts in terms that might defy universality. Instead, we offer
arguments and conclusions without a commitment or proof that
they are universal in a nontrivial sense. We seek the best ob-
jections to our judgments, and when a judgment overcomes
these objections, we retain it until we consider the next batch
of objections and then fallibilist verification begins again.
Particularist rationality seeks consensus in terms of pragmatic
41. For a discussion of foundationalism, and antifoundationalism, see Robert
Justin Lipkin, Can American Constitutional Law Be Postmodern?, 42 BUFF. L. REV.
317 (1994).
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solutions that in no way resolve the conflict finally or without
possibility of revision.
A third view, call it "deliberative rationality," combines ele-
ments of universal rationality and particularist rationality.
Since judgments usually take the form "X is right in C" or "A is
right in doing X in C," where "A" is an agent, 'X" is an action
and "C" are the circumstances, such judgments incorporate and
preclude elements of universality. They incorporate elements of
universality because a judgment of this form applies to any
person in relevantly similar circumstances. In short, the univer-
sality is built into the logical form of the judgment. These judg-
ments preclude universality because no judgment of the form X
is always wrong" is intelligible without identifying the relevant
circumstances. Try any of the familiar examples "It is wrong to
kill" or "It is wrong to lie." Nobody believes that it is wrong to
kill independently of context because nobody reasonably believes
it is wrong for human beings to build houses which kill plant
and animal life. Humankind must kill (some things) in order to
live. Similarly, no one believes that it is wrong to lie in every
conceivable case."
Of course these observations do not resolve the question of
cultural or moral relativism. A cultural absolutist can accept
this proposal concerning the logical form of moral judgments by
insisting that cultural factors never or rarely count as relevant
factors or circumstances. Thus, the moral absolutist will con-
sider Roberto culpable in killing Duncan in response to an
insult, despite the fact that in some cultures this reason justi-
fies killing. The absolutist insists that such a reason either
justifies or excuses killing in all cases or never justifies or ex-
cuses it; cultural differences are irrelevant. On the other hand,
a cultural relativist believes that such cultural differences must
be included in the "in C" designator, and will inculpate killings
in certain cultures while exculpating them in others.
42. Kant thought differently. Immanuel Kant, On A Supposed Right to Tell Lies
from Benevolent Motives, in KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER
WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 361 (T. Abbott, trans., 6th ed. 1967) (arguing
against Benjamin Constant's view permitting a lie when the recipient of the informa-
tion has no right to the truth). But see Christine Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant
on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325, 339 (1986) (arguing that lying is
permissible in certain contexts).
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Judgments evaluating conduct always require morally rele-
vant descriptions of the actor, the act and the circumstances.
No form of universality across descriptions is possible. Hence,
deliberative rationality is committed to giving reasons for and
against various judgments counseling the inquirer to embrace
the judgment having the best reasons-where best is under-
stood in terms of comprehensiveness, depth, and coherence, as
well as the judgment's role in the process of inquiry and per-
suasion. Deliberative rationality is a pragmatic conception of
inquiry endorsing the universal rationalist's conception of the
importance of reasoning and verification and the particularlist's
conception of the importance of context and circumstances. The
distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures embrac-
es this conception of deliberative rationality. Let us now turn to
a statement of this distinction.
B. Deliberative and Dedicated Cultures
Deliberative judgments are defended by the best reasons
relevant to the reliability43 and scope of the judgment. In
antifoundationalist, deliberative systems, all judgments are
revisable, though not at the same time." Deliberative judg-
ments must be rejected in terms of superior alternative
43. The reliability of a judgment includes the judgment's capacity for overcoming
objections, its capacity for supporting and being supported by other judgments, as
well as its depth or entrenchment in a cultural system.
44. Deliberative systems can be universalist or particularist depending upon the
conception of deliberation under discussion. You can, of course, believe that delibera-
tion applies to human culture generally and thus bridges the gap between the univer-
sal and the particular. The deliberative attitude takes this last approach. The deliber-
ative attitude seeks universal acceptance for a proposed cultural imperative on prag-
matic grounds, recognizing that dissensus is endemic to cultural conflict and
contestability will never be overcome entirely.
One problem with this last approach is that a human culture consisting of all
existent cultures is likely to be incoherent or, more specifically, is likely to have at
least pockets of incoherence that might resist reconciliation. On the other hand, such
pockets of incoherence provide the subject matter for creative redescriptions of these
problems with the possibility of rectifying the incoherence and providing a more ele-
gant and comprehensive description of human culture. Freedom and equality were
once (are still?) such redescriptions.
45. Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences, in LOGICAL POSITIvISM 201 (A. J. Ayer ed.,
1959) ("We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able
to dismantle it in a dry-dock and to reconstruct it out there out of the best materi-
als.").
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judgments, and generally, one never has reason to reject an
entire culture unless one has an alternative cultural system.46
The ideal of deliberation integrates truth, justification, and the
reflective criticism of a community of individuals committed to
deliberation in their political, social, and personal lives.47
The role of community in deliberative constructs is important
and needs clarification. Community is both a cause and effect of
human choice. Community is a necessary causal condition of
human choice because human choice requires delibera-
tion-critically scrutinizing and correcting one's judgments-and
deliberation requires a social context of shared linguistic and
ratiocinative practices. The role of reason and justification can
only be understood in terms of linguistic practices or forms of
life that have produced the practices of criticism and correction
as well as the requisite standards to implement these practic-
es.4" In this way reason and justification derive from communi-
ty, but once derived, reason and justification enable individuals
to make further choices. These choices are the effect of commu-
46. I do not mean to suggest that one can never abandon one's local culture,
though doing so may present psychological obstacles. I suppose a Westerner can aban-
don Western culture and become a Buddhist monk, but one cannot abandon every
actual human culture for a newly designed culture. Cultures must be lived, and aban-
doning one's culture typically involves reweaving one's conceptual scheme
incrementally in terms of the newly adopted cultural scheme. However, in revolution-
ary cultural change, "a once-strong, indeed culturally dominant, mode of thought can
collapse almost literally overnight." SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 52
(1988). But it is difficult to imagine rejecting an entire culture in one instance for
another culture. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979)
(adapting Thomas Kuhn's distinction between revolutionary and normal science to the
context of discourse); see also THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS (1970). For a redeployment of the Kuhn-Rorty distinction between revolutionary
and normal inquiry, see Lipkin, supra note 39; Robert Justin Lipkin, Indeterminacy,
Justification and Truth in Constitutional Theory, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1992);
Robert Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REV. 701
(1989); Robert Justin Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Rev-
olutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1988). Each of these articles represent state-
ments and refinements of the theory of constitutional revolutions, a theory that dis-
tinguishes between normal and revolutionary adjudication.
47. Frederick Schauer helpfully provides an account of some of the problems truth
and justification pose for constitutional deliberation that can be extended to delibera-
tion generally. Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About Deliberation, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1187 (1992).
48. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 241 (88e)
(1953); see also Robert Justin Lipkin, Freewill, Responsibility and the Promise of Fo-
rensic Psychiatry, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 331 (1991).
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nity in two ways. First, it is only when a community of practi-
cal reasoners is already formed that individuals can make their
lone autonomous choices. Since reasoning is itself social, practi-
cal reasoning can only occur when the individual has learned
the appropriate methods of practical reasoning from others, and
this requires a community in which the methods of practical
reasoning are practiced. Second, living a conscientious life re-
quires making choices in deliberative contexts, where you con-
sider how others would evaluate your choices.49 Finally, com-
munity is the effect of human choice and deliberation, since the
further development of a community from a bare community to
a full community (including the state) requires human decision
and action."
I wish to contrast deliberative constructs or forms of inquiry
with dedicated forms of inquiry, though I do not want to sug-
gest that any mature culture must be constituted by one to the
exclusion of the other.5 ' Nevertheless, we can distinguish be-
tween deliberative forms of inquiry and dedicated forms of
inquiry and therefore distinguish between cultures that are
predominantly deliberative or predominantly dedicated.52 In
49. Some forms of deliberative reasoning invoke the concepts of mutual respect,
provisional solutions, empathy, and reasonableness. See Amy Gutmann, The Challenge
of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 171, 199 (1993). Accord-
ing to Gutmann, "[d]eliberation encourages people with conflicting perspective to un-
derstand each other's point of view, to minimize moral disagreements, and to search
for common ground. . . ." Id. at 199. It achieves these goals by first "opening politics
up to a range of reasonable disagreements that is restricted by less deliberative poli-
tics." Id. This might be true. But before endorsing it, we must have a clearer idea of
what counts as reasonable disagreement. As Gutmann herself concedes, "what counts
as reasonable or unreasonable for matters of social justice cannot be specified inde-
pendently of social understandings." Id. at 201. Gutmann goes on to say that reason-
ableness "with regard to matters of social justice excludes claims that are closed in
principle to the most adequate methods of social inquiry." Id. Thus, publicly accessible
claims, for example, about the importance of personal liberty render judgments more
reasonable than claims about God's will. But how does one determine whether public-
ly accessible claims or God's will represent "the most adequate methods of inquiry?"
Id. Either choice can be defended only by begging the question.
50. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 208-15 (1986) (exploring the differences
between bare communities and full communities).
51. William Galston invokes a distinction between two kinds of liberalism: autono-
my and diversity. William Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHIcs 516
(1995). Galston's distinction between these two types of liberalism should be distin-
guished from my distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures.
52. A comprehensive treatment of deliberative and dedicated cultures would in-
clude an examination of the possibility of describing ideal deliberative cultures and
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such cultures we can distinguish between primary and second-
ary cultural strategies. Sometimes primary and secondary cul-
tural strategies are lexically ordered and resist incoherence. In
other cases, the primary and secondary cultural strategies are
in tension and yield incoherent cultural outlooks.
Dedicated forms of inquiry begin with natural and cultural
givens. Human beings constitute a certain kind of biological
form that determines certain features of human conduct. For
example, food, sex, and work are three aspects of human expe-
rience that are biologically given.5" This does not mean that
society and culture are irrelevant to the particular manifesta-
tions of these biological forms, only that the choice of whether
we should be the kind of organism that typically needs to eat,
to procreate, and to gather materials for food and shelter are
questions nature has resolved for us.
Our inclinations for food, sex, and work are dedicated needs,
though the precise form our gratification assumes in any case
may not be dedicated. To talk of dedicated needs only means
that we need certain things if we are to survive at all. The
further we travel from biological givens, the less a need is pure-
ly dedicated. We also have needs that are constitutive of human
flourishing, though the precise nature of these needs is indeter-
minate and contestable. Many of these needs are not dedicated,
but arise only after reflection and deliberation; for example,
respect and dignity. Thus, the concept of dedicated needs in no
ideal dedicated cultures. In the worst case scenario, it might turn out that all cul-
tures require traditions that mimic dedicated cultures. Rorty's remarks on democracy
lend themselves to such an interpretation when he insists that democracy is impor-
tant because it is "so basic to one's identity that one wouldn't know who one was if
one stopped cherishing [it]." Towards A Liberal Utopia: An Interview with Richard
Rorty, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, June 24, 1994, at 14. Thus, democracy and even
perhaps deliberative democracy are based on a dedicated paradigm. If so, the heart of
the distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures can still be preserved by
distinguishing between deliberative traditions and non-deliberative traditions within
dedicated cultures.
53. Of course, each of these activities can be refrained from in certain circum-
stances. To say that these are biologically given means only that, in these circum-
stances, a price must be paid to avoid engaging in these activities, such as death in
the case of not eating. Consequently, my remarks concerning biological givens should
not be understood as endorsing Social Darwinism or any other conservative anthropo-
logical perspective on the relationship between biology and social organization.
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way reflects Rawls's conception of primary goods.54 Most, if not
all, primary goods are not dedicated needs.
The vast portion of dedicated needs arise in social and cultur-
al contexts. Since even dedicated biological needs require social
and cultural expression, we would not be far wrong in regard-
ing all dedicated needs as cultural needs. Dedicated cultural
inquiry involves cultural givens that are fixed and not designed
for change, though they can be re-designed to change in
nondeliberative ways.55 I say that such cultural givens are not
designed to change, not that they do not change. A dedicated
culture appreciating the fact that even its most cherished insti-
tutions do in fact change may construct mechanisms to prevent
or control significant change.56 Some dedicated cultures might
be more amenable to change, seeking to direct change to better
fifill their dedicated values." At some point, however, when a
54. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE 62 (1971).
55. It could be argued that the status quo, like everything else, must change in
order to perpetuate itself, or, as Stanley Fish observed, "[t]he maintenance of the sta-
tus quo is always and simultaneously its alteration[.]" See Adam Begely, Souped-Up
Scholar, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 3, 1992, at 38, 52. We can extend this point to the
idea of a tradition. Traditions must change to stay the same, since a "tradition is not
simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we
understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it
ourselves." HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 293 (1989). In constitutional
adjudication,
[tihe traditions to which we look for guidance ... are traditions that we
create, and recreate upon each engagement. Traditions constrain us, cer-
tainly, both in the sense that they are deeply internalized and in the
sense that we pledge to follow their external signs. But their meanings
are too unstable for those signs to be definitive, and we-individually
and collectively-are too conflicted for the internal constraints to be dis-
positive.
Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern
Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 78 (1995).
56. Dedicated cultures face the following paradox: if they design a mechanism to
prevent or control significant change, it probably is a deliberative mechanism; howev-
er, if it is a deliberative mechanism, it is based on reasons that, at least relative to
that culture's aspirations, are good ones. In other words, a dedicated culture adopts
the mechanism to control change because it believes that significant change is dan-
gerous or counter-productive. Such a reason is usually a deliberative reason, though it
might be a bad deliberative reason. Consequently, it is paradoxical for dedicated cul-
tures to deliberatively adopt a mechanism to prevent cultural change. The air of
paradox is not reduced by the fact that at times a dedicated culture's decision to con-
trol change may be characterized as nondeliberative.
57. I owe this point to Erin Daly.
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dedicated culture too readily embraces change, it ceases to be
dedicated and embraces an inchoate form of deliberativism.
The idea of dedicated concepts or norms is antithetical to
deliberative, rational criticism which involves continued vigi-
lance in perfecting and refining its normative commitments as
well as its concept of a norm. To describe a culture as dedicat-
ed, however, does not deny that it has meaning that succeeding
generations may interpret and reinterpret. What it does mean
is that these interpretations must remain within the confines of
the culture, whereas deliberative cultures are self-consciously
concerned with justifying their cultures in the broadest possible
terms. Hasidic Jews and the Amish are examples of predomi-
nantly dedicated cultures within American society." These cul-
tures have a certain character and style: the Amish, for in-
stance, eschew a reliance on sophisticated technology, such as
electricity, in the attempt to remain independent and self-suffi-
cient. 9 Both cultures have dedicated habits of dress serving as
badges of honor for their members."
Dedicated cultures usually include fixed or committed pro-
cesses of change, usually determined by the contents of a privi-
leged text or the historic pronouncements of a sanctified person,
58. When dedicated and deliberative cultures live in close proximity and share
the same resources, conflict is likely. Consider the contemporary example of the state
of New York intentionally drawing the boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel so
that the Satmar Hasidim could run a public school district exclusively. Kiryas Joel v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
59. Some Native American Indian cultures also appear to be dedicated. However,
as in the case of the Amish and the Hasidim, characterizing Native American cul-
tures as dedicated (or deliberative) requires greater substantiation than merely saying
it is so. The point here is not only that generalization requires support, but more
importantly, generalizations concerning racial, sexual, ethnic, and cultural attributions
should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that they are not motivated by cultural
antagonism or mere lack of familiarity with the character of a particular culture. I
thank Bob Hayman for helping me to appreciate the importance of this point.
60. Generally, dedicated cultures do not relish novel ways to solve problems, nor
do they attempt to validate the tenets of their culture by seeking disconfirming evi-
dence. Dedicated cultures do not consider personal autonomy as an overriding value
driving and guiding cultural change. By contrast, deliberative cultures seek
disconfirming evidence and regard autonomy as a central cultural value. This illus-
trates that some features of the dominant American culture are at most deliberative
in name only. A once deliberative form of inquiry can become a dedicated value when
it ceases to insist on challenging its own form of rationality and when its commit-
ment to autonomy wanes. See LEvINSON, supra note 46 at 52 (arguing that American
constitutional culture represents a civic religion based not on reason but faith).
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but the concept of a dedicated culture is not necessarily com-
mitted to these processes. Conceivably, a dedicated culture
might even embrace certain forms of democratic change, provid-
ed that democracy serves dedicated ends and is not designed to
aid and encourage individual liberty. For example, a dedicated
culture might use democracy to make incremental changes in
the life of the culture when confronted with crisis, or it might
place dedicated constraints on democratic institutions. The
legislature, for instance, might be confined only to preserving
the actual dedicated values and norms of the given culture. The
distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures, in
short, cannot be drawn in terms of democratic cultures and
nondemocratic ones.
Dedicated cultures usually seek to preserve traditional mech-
anisms for solving problems, and are concerned with maintain-
ing the precise character of group identity, though both these
elements may not be necessary features of a dedicated culture.
One can imagine a dedicated culture holding that human be-
ings have a faculty of moral or practical intuition that answers
all such problems in a non-deliberative fashion. A dedicated
culture of this kind might not rely on tradition and group iden-
tity any more than deliberative cultures do when these conflict
with what is learned through intuition. Even in these circum-
stances, however, the dedicated culture is likely to embrace the
faculty of intuition as a defining characteristic of the culture. In
this way group identity-people who intuitively think like
us-might reinstate the importance of the group's character as
a defining characteristic of the culture.
Although the distinction between deliberative and dedicated
forms of inquiry is fairly straightforward, it can arise in unusu-
al ways. For example, one might understand the constitutional
theory of originalism as a dedicated form of inquiry because it
counsels us to accept the Framers' interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions as if these individuals were the sanctified
leaders of a dedicated culture. However, while some originalists
recommend adopting the Framers' interpretations of the Consti-
tution as privileged because on an originalist theory of meaning
the only way to understand the text is to determine the
author's meaning, others argue for originalism because it serves
democratic ends. Neither one of these arguments need involve
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dedicated concepts, though to be free of any dedicated elements,
originalism must explain why meaning should be understood as
authorial meaning, and why their conception of democracy is
the best available one.5 '
A deliberative culture, therefore, can have privileged texts
and sanctified historical leaders. If it is a truly deliberative cul-
ture, it will have found reasons for adopting originalism as a
theory of constitutional meaning. This means that in delibera-
tive cultures a particular constitutional methodology must sur-
vive the objections of all comers. The deliberative attitude in
constitutional matters, as well as elsewhere, means your opin-
ion is always open to question.2
II. DEFENDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DELIBERATIVE AND
DEDICATED CULTURES
A. The Distinction and Other Similar Dichotomies
In this section I evaluate some important objections to the
distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures. The
central purpose is to demonstrate that the distinction between
deliberative and dedicated is a unique distinction that is not
reducible to any more familiar distinctions.
1. Reason and Tradition
First, it might be objected that reasoning occurs in both de-
liberative and dedicated contexts, and therefore does not distin-
guish two different types of cultures or methods of cultural
inquiry.63 This objection is correct as far as it goes. But the
61. See Lipkin, supra note 41.
62. In this sense, the deliberative attitude replaces or is a counterpart to the
traditional goal of universality, though not a universality that will satisfy
foundationalists or absolutists. To say that a deliberative form of inquiry is always
open to confutation means that it ultimately seeks non-idiosyncratic reasons for its
conclusions. At times this might entail seeking non-culturally specific reasons, mean-
ing that the source of the reason is irrelevant, whether it derives from our culture or
others. What matters is the force of the reason in explaining or illuminating the
problem we want resolved. And it is not obvious that force requires culturally specific
motivation.
63. The term "cultural inquiry" refers to those concepts, distinctions, and princi-
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distinction between deliberative and dedicated forms of inquiry
and cultures is not a distinction between reasoning and tradi-
tion; instead, it is a distinction between different kinds of rea-
soning. For instance, no form of cultural inquiry and change
can survive without deductive and inductive reasoning. Conse-
quently, in order to understand the distinction between deliber-
ative and dedicated cultures, we must distinguish between the
kinds of reasoning that distinguish them. In short, the distinc-
tion is a distinction between two different kinds of cultural
attitudes: the deliberative attitude and the dedicated attitude.
The deliberative attitude incorporates deliberative rationality
and deliberative autonomy." Deliberative rationality is a criti-
cal process of giving the best reasons for and against substan-
tive cultural judgments. Deliberative rationality determines the
existence of values, the scope of such values, and how to rank
conflicting values. This deliberative process recognizes the im-
portance of fallibility and the inclination to revise the culture's
substantive commitments when the evidence dictates.
In contrast, dedicated cultures understand their cultural
values as representing the final truth about the meaning and
value of life. Serious re-evaluation of cultural norms or values
occurs rarely, and when it does occur, it is limited by dedicated
constraints.65 The reasoning of fully dedicated cultures includes
both dedicated means as well as dedicated ends. Dedicated
cultures are concerned with predictability, order, and closure
and therefore restrict both the quality and the quantity of ap-
propriate cultural reasoning. Consequently, though reasoning
occurs in dedicated cultures, the depth and breadth of the rea-
soning is severely limited.
ples of inference that enable us to make sense of social life. For example, the distinc-
tion between "nature" and "nurture" helps classify human interests into two catego-
ries: those interests that are biologically given and those that are a product of social
life and culture.
64. I offer these components as part of deliberativism as the most basic form of
strategy employed by the individual. This individual ideal, however, expresses itself in
the collectivist, political ideal of democracy. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democrat-
ic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17, 21, 25 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds.,
1989).
65. Dedicated reasoning involves the standard cognitive capacities of identification,
individuating, deductive and inductive reasoning, and so forth. If a dedicated rule
admonishes people to obey the word of the Holy Person, reasoning is required to
know who the Holy Person is and what counts as her word.
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The difference between deliberative and dedicated cultures
also rests in the deliberative culture's commitment to autonomy
and fallibilism. Through self-regulation, deliberative autonomy
guides the reason-giving process both for the individual and for
the society. The members of a deliberative culture are always
open to the criticism and correction of cultural and personal
values. The members, individually and collectively, seek evi-
dence to discredit their own values."
This paradoxical feature of the deliberative attitude derives
from the conviction that cultural values are reliable only when
they continually survive challenge. In a dedicated culture, the
role of criticism is diminished greatly. No explicit (and rarely
implicit) cultural imperatives exist requiring or permitting indi-
vidual members to criticize, revise, and reform society. Indeed,
criticism, revision, and reform may be severely restricted or
expressly forbidden. The deep structure of a dedicated culture is
concerned with truth (at least from its own perspective), finali-
ty, and closure.
While the distinction between deliberative and dedicated
inquiry does not track the distinction between reason and tradi-
tion, it does include a distinction between deliberative reasoning
and dedicated reasoning. According to this distinction, delibera-
tive reasoning is fallibilistic and autonomy-oriented, while dedi-
cated reasoning is directed at preserving the identity of the
group as expressed through the dedicated values of that cul-
ture. Moreover, dedicated cultures do not value individual au-
tonomy and self-realization independently, as do deliberative
cultures.67 Deliberative cultures continually seek the best rea-
sons to support cultural inquiry. Consequently, a deliberative
culture employs deliberative reasoning, even concerning the
question of its own legitimacy. Dedicated cultures restrict rea-
soning within the confines of its dedicated values.
66. For alternative accounts of deliberative autonomy, see Larry A. Alexander,
Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 875 (1994); and James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution,
72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993).
67. This does not necessarily imply that deliberative cultures are anti-
communitarian.
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To describe deliberativism as incorporating deliberative au-
tonomy is not to say that all values in deliberative society are
"chosen anew" with each generation. Nor is it that autonomy-
oriented values are the only values considered important by
deliberative cultures.6 8 Of course, values in a deliberative cul-
ture "have been adopted, inculcated, absorbed from an envelop-
ing social environment."69 But deliberative values are always
subject to critical re-examination. Moreover, the justification of
these values is always deliberative. If challenged, those endors-
ing the deliberative attitude must present their reasons in de-
fense of a particular practice, as well as reasons showing why
an alternative practice cannot survive deliberative scrutiny.' °
2. Freedom and Authority
A second objection insists that the distinction between delib-
erative and dedicated cultures founders because it characterizes
deliberative cultures as free or autonomous while dedicated
cultures are authoritarian. Instead, the argument continues,
freedom is a necessary element of both kinds of cultures. 1 In-
68. Autonomy-oriented values apply to both persons and to states of affairs. Cf. S.
I. Benn, Person and Values: Reasons in Conflict and Moral Disagreement, 95 ETHICS
20, 24-27 (1984) (distinguishing between person-centered reasons and value-centered
reasons).
69. Id. at 36.
70. Are rationality and autonomy merely dedicated values of "deliberative" cul-
tures? How much of their meaning is open to inquiry and reconsideration? In ideal
circumstances, their meaning is always open to inquiry and reconsideration. In prac-
tice, some deliberative cultures allow the deliberative attitude to atrophy or to become
mechanical. In the limiting cases, the deliberative attitude can become dedicated, or
rather, it can be held in a non-deliberative fashion. This, however, is a failing of the
particular culture, not the concept of a well functioning deliberative culture. I am
grateful to Bob Hayman for assisting me in seeing the significance of this point.
71. Similarly, it can be argued that the distinction between freedom and custom
is specious because custom is a necessary ingredient of autonomy. On this view, free-
dom cannot exist in a vacuum. Society cannot generate institutions that are free
without custom, and custom often requires freedom for its generation. As Roger
Scruton observes:
I have given a few, partly empirical, partly a priori, reasons for thinking
that custom and its associated forms of conduct are necessary for the
formation of the 'primary' desires that form the basis of our autonomy. It
is only such desires that political freedom should be concerned to foster,
since it is only then that freedom can be considered a value. Custom is
not, then, the enemy of freedom, but it is a necessary precondition. The
business of government is not the generation of abstract civil liberty, but
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deed, it is difficult to imagine what a totally free or a totally
authoritarian culture would be like. It is true that liberty and
freedom often are considered a critical feature of deliberative
cultures, while dedicated cultures are often authoritarian. How-
ever, when stated as a generalization, this overlooks the fact
that "the history, culture and religion of the community may be
such that authoritarian regimes come .. . naturally, reflecting a
widely shared world view or way of life."72
This is not an endorsement of authoritarian regimes. Instead,
it merely indicates that a dedicated culture might survive be-
cause it achieves the continued loyalty of the majority of its
members concerning the meaning of life and the proper rela-
tionship of cultural and legal institutions to the people affected
by these institutions. A particular dedicated culture might hope
to survive by the consent of its members without imposing its
values on an unwilling populace. The members of the culture
might be fervently willing to preserve the culture. 3 Keep in
mind that requiring a consensus for cultural legitimacy does
not preclude dedicated cultures from being legitimate. Consent
can be part of a dedicated culture or regime.74 But doesn't this
the founding of institutions that make liberty possible.
Roger Scruton, Freedom and Custom, in ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICS AND MORAL
CONSERVATWISM 205, para. 22 (S.G. Clarke & E. Simpson eds., 1989). No culture-free
liberty or pure liberty exists, and that if it did exist it would not be of any value.
Pure liberty "would be situationless." CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY
157 (1979). Consider:
And by the same token it would be empty. Complete freedom would be a
void in which nothing would be worth doing, nothing would deserve to
count for anything. The self which has arrived at freedom by setting
aside all external obstacles and impingements is characterless, and hence
without definite purposes, however much this is hidden by such seeming-
ly positive terms as 'rationality' or 'creativity.' These are ultimately quite
indeterminate as criteria for human action or modes of life. They cannot
specify any content to our action outside of a situation which sets goals
for us, which thus imparts a shape to rationality and provides an inspi-
ration for creativity.
Id. Nor is it the case that deliberative autonomy has no unchosen conditions. See
Lipkin, supra note 48.
72. Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209, 225
(1980).
73. At this point, the question of minority repression becomes urgently relevant.
74. We can see how even dedicated cultures can be legitimate in a liberal sense
of the term when its members consent to its authority. See A- JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL
PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 71 (1979) (describing a legitimate government
as one that has authority over its citizens through their consent).
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make the culture deliberative if its legitimacy depends on con-
sent? Not necessarily. A culture can rest on consent and still be
dedicated if the values consented to are dedicated values, not
discovered or justified through deliberative reasoning. Addition-
ally, these values are dedicated if consent concerns mere prefer-
ence, and not deliberative consent. 5 Deliberative consent re-
quires more than liberty-which after all is a negative freedom;
in addition deliberative consent requires individual autonomy,
and autonomy refers to the operation of each individual's capac-
ity for practical reasoning.
Deliberative cultures rank individual and collective autonomy
as primary values. Therefore, deliberative cultures value con-
sent, but the converse does not follow. Like cultures generally,
a dedicated culture must secure consent, but it can do so with-
out adopting the deliberative attitude. Similarly, consent can be
a legitimizing feature of a culture without the culture valuing
deliberative autonomy. To determine whether the culture is
deliberative or dedicated we must know more than that cultural
legitimacy requires consent. If values arise and are justified
through a process of criticism and evaluation with the goal of
enhancing autonomy, then the culture is deliberative. If values
arise and are justified through appeals to authority for the
purpose of constancy and closure, then the culture is dedicated.
However, consent can be a feature of both processes. Just be-
cause cultural values are not deliberatively chosen does not
mean that these values are not genuinely valued by the cul-
ture, or that they do not have great relevance to the lives of
the members.
It is true, of course, that dedicated cultures are not autono-
mously chosen, "but then no set of political institutions is ever
freely chosen from the full range of alternatives by a single set
of people at a single moment in time."76 Even though a con-
75. This raises the question of just what American democracy means. Does it
mean mere majoritarianism together with a few explicit constraints as Robert Bork
contends? ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990). Or is the American conception of democracy deliberative democracy?
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). For a critical examination of
Sunstein's important work, see Robert Justin Lipkin, The Quest for the Common
Good: Neutrality and Deliberative Democracy in Sunstein's Conception of American
Constitutionalism, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1039 (1994).
76. SIMMONS, supra note 74, at 70.
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sensus of shared perceptions, judgments and actions might exist
in a dedicated society, the members of the society might sin-
cerely endorse the regime, despite never having consciously
chosen it or even despite never having the opportunity for such
choice. Consequently, we cannot distinguish between delibera-
tive and dedicated cultures by appealing to the distinction be-
tween consent-oriented societies and authority-oriented societies.
Deliberative societies are clearly consent-oriented, but in princi-
ple, there is no reason why dedicated cultures cannot give a
significant, though limited, role to consent.
It could be argued that there are weaker and stronger con-
ceptions of consent. The weak conception contends simply that
the members of the culture consent to the culture's values and
requirements. The stronger conception maintains that consent is
required for cultural legitimacy. It could then be argued that
only the first conception of consent can be included in the no-
tion of a dedicated culture. I would go further to argue that
even when consent is formally tied to cultural legitimacy the
values consented to may be dedicated values. Of course, even
when using the first conception, cultural legitimacy may still
depend on consent if only as a subliminal and highly informal
mechanism.
If consent is not sufficient in itself to distinguish between
deliberative and dedicated cultures, autonomy clearly is. A
deliberative culture considers autonomy as a necessary and, in
some circumstances, a sufficient condition of the deliberative
attitude." As stated earlier, the deliberative attitude includes
deliberative rationality, the process of achieving epistemic reli-
ability through fallibilistic verification. In the context of cultural
inquiry this involves giving reasons for and against both means
and ends in a critical, fallibilist fashion. The deliberative atti-
tude, however, also includes deliberative autonomy. Deliberative
autonomy is concerned with individual and collective self-deter-
mination, self-reflection, self-regulation, and self-criticism. We
shape our lives by creating norms of personal and social con-
77. Not all values are autonomy-oriented. But in deliberative cultures the non-au-
tonomy-oriented values must always be subject to deliberative evaluation to determine
which values maximize autonomy and choice. If some values are neutral regarding
this process of maximization, deliberative cultures have the discretion to embrace
those values or not.
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duct.78 It is this deliberative attitude, consisting of deliberative
rationality and deliberative autonomy, that must be part of a
deliberative culture. The deliberative attitude, especially its
component of deliberative autonomy, is what distinguishes de-
liberative and dedicated cultures.
According to deliberative autonomy "[a]n autonomous person
is self-governing where self-government requires that people
engage in deliberation in shaping the many dimensions of their
lives, personal and political."7 9 The deliberative attitude "en-
courages autonomy, our ability to shape our lives in accordance
with well-considered judgments."" Amy Gutmann provides an
instructive account of the kind of autonomy embraced by the
deliberative attitude.
An autonomous person wants to evaluate choices in life,
including the choice of delegating decisions, and live life in
accordance with these evaluations. The desire to live such a
life is a matter of autonomous character; the ability is also
a matter of information, education, will power, and good
fortune. By its very nature, autonomy cannot be given to
people; it must be claimed. But political practices and insti-
tutions can encourage or discourage autonomy, render au-
tonomy impossible or within our grasp.8 '
Gutmann is right. A person cannot be autonomous if her self-
conception prompts her to accept the views of others uncritical-
ly and if she has no great desire to be unique, distinct, and
independent. One must struggle to become autonomous and
78. Consider: "One creates values, generates, through one's developing commit-
ments and pursuits, reasons which transcend the reasons one had for undertaking
one's commitments and pursuits. In that way a person's life is (in part) of his own
making. It is a normative creation, a creation of new values and reasons." JOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 387 (1986).
79. Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in 35 NOMOS: DEMOCRATIC
COMMIANITY 126, 140 (John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) (arguing for
deliberative democracy); see also David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and Social
Choice, 40 POL. STUD. 54 (1992) (arguing in favor of a conception of deliberative de-
mocracy similar to Gutmann's); see generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBER-
ALISM (1969) (arguing against interest-group liberalism). See IAN SHAPIRO, POLITICAL
CRITICISM 282 (1990) (arguing that democracy "should be thought of as that system of
structured instabilities that best prevents the ossification of arbitrary entitlements
and undermines entrenched power without collapsing into anarchial chaos.").
80. Gutmann, supra note 79, at 141.
81. Id. at 142.
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self-authenticating. A person is self-authenticating when her
character ultimately derives from self-critical choices made in
the context of a community of other individuals adopting the
deliberative attitude. A self-authenticating person is one whose
character is justified to oneself and others. 2
It is crucial, however, not to overlook the requirement that
deliberative autonomy can exist only when the conditions for
developing the deliberative attitude are institutional fixtures of
one's culture. Among these conditions are freedom from external
compulsion and encouragement of the inclination to be self-
authenticating. Only when these conditions are present can a
deliberative character develop. In this sense, a deliberative
person must be given autonomy before she can claim it. Uncho-
sen conditions of choice must first exist for autonomy to exist
at all.83
Self-authentication involves appreciating the conditions that
make different lives meaningful as well as the conditions that
lead to an impoverished emptiness and alienation. The political
conditions necessary for the development of the deliberative
character must allow for experimentation, revision, and a de-
termination to stand behind self-authenticated values. The
deliberative character has little chance in societies in which
such major institutions as schools, churches, and the workplace
do not encourage the development of this inclination. Only
when such political conditions exist can a person then claim au-
tonomy.'
Gutmann is also right in stating that deliberative autonomy
does not preclude delegating decision-making authority. The key
82. Adopting the deliberative attitude entails wanting to justify yourself to others,
especially when your adversaries reject the deliberative attitude. See Thomas M.
Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103, 116
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
83. These conditions can be metaphysical or political. Although there have been
formidable attempts to determine the metaphysical conditions, it is not obvious that
any have succeeded. I have in mind Kant's attempt in THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS and both the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON and the CRITIQUE
OF PRACTICAL REASON. For a challenging contemporary attempt, see THOMAS NAGEL,
THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970).
84. For a more comprehensive statement of how autonomy includes unchosen
conditions, see Lipkin, supra note 48. See also, Edward Sankowski, Blame and Auton-
omy, 29 AMER. PHIL. Q. 291 (1992).
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word here is delegating in contradistinction to abdicating. In an
array of circumstances, it makes perfect sense to let others
make decisions for you provided that you retain ultimate con-
trol over the decisions and that they are accountable to you.
Thus, a deliberative culture, one which encourages autonomy,
need not be radically individualistic or one in which each per-
son decides everything of importance from scratch.85 When
there are good reasons for delegating authority, the deliberative
attitude is fulfilled, not abrogated. By contrast the alienation of
autonomy is anathema to the deliberative attitude.86 Alienation
occurs when one gives up the right to question, criticize, and to
hold others accountable, or when others assume such authority
by coercion.
3. Democracy and Authority
This last point has implications for democracy. A democracy
can exist when people are free from external coercion, even
when they are not autonomous. In other words, the idea of
democracy implies that political decisions rest with the citizen-
ry; it does not imply that each citizen's opinions be autonomous
or reflective. Consequently, if autonomy depicts a fundamental
ingredient in the deliberative attitude, a society can be
democratic despite not encouraging the deliberative attitude.
The limiting case of such a society is a dedicated society that is
democratic in permitting the will of the majority to prevail
simply because it is the majority, without encouraging
deliberative politics."s The point here is that we cannot under-
85. In fact, deliberative cultures can rely on the collective natural and cultural
history of humankind provided that this history is subject to cultural interpretation.
See Robert Justin Lipkin, Pragmatism-The Unfinished Revolution: Doctrinaire and
Reflective Pragmatism in Rorty's Social Thought, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1561 (1993).
86. Gutmann, supra note 69, at 145.
87. In contemporary debates, such a view is championed by Robert Bork in THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA. BORK supra note 75. Permitting the majority will to prevail
simply because it is the will of the majority is not ruled out a priori by the delibera-
tive attitude. However, since the deliberative attitude seeks reasons for individual and
collective decisions, the majority must always be prepared to justify its decisions in
terms other than simple majoritarianism. Bork's reply doubtlessly would be that re-
quiring the majority to give reasons for its preferences is pointless and redundant.
Who decides whether the majority's reasons are good reasons? In the absence of ex-
plicit constraints, any institution responsible for evaluating the majority's reasons
other than the majoritarian branches of government is countermajoritarian and there-
1995] 1293
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1263
stand the distinction between deliberative cultures by distin-
guishing between democratic and nondemocratic cultures.88
Sometimes the background conditions of democratic societies
depict a dedicated, not a deliberative, culture. For example,
when wealth plays an inordinate role in voting, the resulting
system of voting tends to be dedicated and one that is
anathema to democracy.89
In a dedicated culture, even when a consensus exists concern-
ing its legitimacy, the consensus is contingent and sometimes
unstable. In a deliberative culture, consensus is systematically
tested and refined as a matter of cultural and institutional
imperative. In a dedicated culture, everyone might consent to
the cultural system when the effects of its institutions are sta-
ble and productive. But then its members are lucky that their
culture has such fortuitous consequences. In such circumstanc-
es, the consensus is contingently stable. A dedicated culture is
still less free than a deliberative one because critical examina-
tion of the culture is not required or encouraged, and in some
cases it is proscribed. Deliberative cultures seek a consensus on
certain substantive values, but often create the conditions for a
plurality of values. Some might argue that dedicated cultures
empirically fare better in creating at least a rudimentary form
of stability than deliberative cultures do.
On the other hand, when debilitating dissension breaks out
in a deliberative society,9" the institutions for criticism and
fore unacceptable. The deliberative process, however, embraces additional and inde-
pendent deliberation-say by the Supreme Court-without being troubled by skeptical
questions about who is to decide whether the majority's reasons are good ones. See
generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). I critically eval-
uate Ackerman's intriguing conception of constitutional democracy in Lipkin, supra
note 41.
88. But see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Politics and Ethics, in FROM THE TWILIGHT
OF PROBABILITY 43, 49 (William R. Shea & Antonio Spadafora eds., 1992) (arguing
that "democracy is part of what it means to be morally autonomous"). Democracy
might be a necessary condition of moral autonomy, but it is not a sufficient condition.
A culture might permit democracy without the deliberative attitude, and therefore,
not encourage moral autonomy.
89. For an interesting argument that the United States Constitution ought to in-
clude a principle of 'equal-dollars-per-voter," see Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-
Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204
(1994).
90. Critical re-evaluation of cultural norms should be an institutional feature of a
deliberative society. See Lipkin, supra note 7.
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change shift into overdrive if the society is designed correctly.
Since they are already in operation in a deliberative culture,
they can be readily applied to the crisis at hand. Should dissen-
sus occur in a dedicated society, the only vehicle for solution
might be the very institutions that cause the dissensus in the
first place. No independent process for expressing, accommodat-
ing, and dealing with dissensus exists, except coercion. Conse-
quently, while pockets of autonomy and freedom exist in dedi-
cated cultures, autonomy is more pervasive and deeper in delib-
erative cultures. Deliberative cultures intend criticism and revi-
sion to be institutional features of the culture, processes in
which every individual is entitled to engage. In dedicated cul-
tures, criticism and revision are not the primary responsibility
of the citizen, if a responsibility at all. If criticism and correc-
tion exist, they are usually the priority of a privileged class of
individuals. Generally, both the quality and quantity of criti-
cism differ in deliberative and dedicated cultures.
4. Reason and Religion
The distinction between deliberative constructs and dedicated
constructs tracks the distinction between reason and religion,
but is not identical to it. Although many religions include dedi-
cated constructs exclusively, some do not. The more a religion
insists that the proposition "God exists" is meaningful and
provable, the more that religion will need deliberative con-
structs in its argument. Religions that cede authority for mak-
ing personal and moral decisions to the individual will depend
upon deliberative concepts. Deliberative concepts are even re-
quired by those religions emphasizing faith as a primary reli-
gious virtue, provided that the religion distinguishes between
faith as a way of coming to know or understand God and delib-
eration as a way of making the concept of God intelligible and
provable.9' Moreover, religions that emphasize responsibility
91. Neither can the distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures be
equated with the distinction between seeking reasonable solutions or accommodations
with one's adversaries, and the inclination to use force. The concept of a deliberative
culture does not entail that its members "may never use violence, coercion or decep-
tion, or that they may never injure in other ways. Actual human disputes often can-
not be resolved without some injury to some parties." Onora ONeill, Reason and the
Resolution of Disputes, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1377 (1992).
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and guilt require at least a limited degree of deliberative auton-
omy within the strict confines of the religion's dedicated values,
and individual members of the religion might be required to
engage in deliberation and choice. In principle, a religious cul-
ture can be committed to maximizing religious freedom for the
members of one religion or for members of every religion within
the culture.2
5. Open and Closed Societies
Nor is the distinction between deliberative and dedicated
cultures identical to the distinction between open and closed
societies. A culture is open when it permits information from
the outside to enter freely into its confines. A closed culture
forbids such information from entering the society, or if such
information is permitted, the culture proscribes the formal,
public recognition of the information. But an open culture can
be a dedicated culture, and a closed culture can be a delibera-
tive one. The question of whether a culture is deliberative or
dedicated involves the role evidentiary information plays in re-
solving cultural conflicts and in promoting cultural change. A
deliberative culture actively seeks appropriate evidentiary infor-
mation relevant to the resolution of conflicts and to promoting
cultural change, while a dedicated culture does not seek such
evidentiary information, and when it is exposed to such infor-
mation does not regard it as evidence for or against its dedicat-
ed values. The question of openness pertains to the extent its
members are exposed to or have access to foreign evidentiary
information. The question of deliberative versus dedicated goes
to whether the information plays an evidentiary role in the
culture's system of cultural inquiry.
Is it then possible to have an open dedicated culture or a
closed deliberative culture? A culture can be dedicated though
still open in that it does not prevent evidentiary information
from entering its borders. When such information does insinu-
ate itself, in a dedicated culture, it will not typically become the
92. For an instructive interpretation of the establishment clause as liberty-maxi-
mizing, see Rodney K Smith, Establishment Clause Analysis: A Liberty Maximizing
Proposal, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 463 (1990).
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ground for cultural change unless the information is sanctified
through a dedicated process of cultural legitimacy. Conceivably,
a dedicated culture can be so confident of its security that it
permits foreign information to freely enter the society. Thus, a
culture can be open, yet remain dedicated. An open, dedicated
culture is committed to its values until an implicit cultural
process overturns these values. One can imagine an open dedi-
cated culture whose values are so beneficial to its members,
and to which the members are so devoted that the openness of
the society has little effect on its dedicated values. For example,
Hasidic Jewry exists in an open American society, and its mem-
bers are aware of information from the greater society, yet they
remain loyal to their dedicated values.93
But can a deliberative culture be a closed one? Consider a
deliberative culture existing in a sea of dedicated cultures each
of which contains a principle of duplicity or deception as a
moral imperative. A deliberative culture therefore has a reason
to suspect the truth of evidentiary information entering its
domain from foreign cultures. In response to this situation, a
deliberative culture can close its conceptual borders to the
surrounding territories on the ground that since incoming
information is unreliable and untrustworthy, it is preferable to
exclude such information entirely and apply the deliberative
process only to information that they can verify themselves. In
this situation the culture is a closed culture, yet it remains
deliberative.94
I do not want to suggest that a closed deliberative culture
can be as deliberative as an open deliberative culture. But that
does not mean that the concept of a closed deliberative culture
93. In most instances it would be hyperbole to describe members of the Hasidim
as "remaining loyal" where that connotes a deliberative choice. Rather, the foreign
evidentiary information never even challenges their beliefs in the first place. Thus
one could object that the Hasidim exist in an open culture but is not itself open, and
thus the example fails. However, some dedicated religious societies seek access to
other cultures while remaining dedicated. Roman Catholicism is a good example of
this point.
94. When anti-deliberative forces abound, defenders of deliberation might restrict
debate on the ground that the enemies of deliberation are poisoning public dialogue.
Put in its best light, if it had one, the anti-communist movement in the United
States illustrates this point. However, a deliberative culture must always be open to
re-examining its reasons for- closing its conceptual borders, and the anti-communism
movement was not.
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is incoherent. In actual circumstances, we may not find any
open societies that are dedicated or any closed cultures that are
deliberative. But this equivalence is an extensional equivalence,
not an intensional one. The distinctions between deliberative
cultures and dedicated cultures, on the one hand, and open and
closed cultures, on the other, overlap. Nevertheless, these dis-
tinctions are not conceptually equivalent.
One might object that this conception of openness is highly
attenuated and tendentious. How can a culture be open unless
it seeks out disconfirming evidentiary information with the
intent of comparing it to present cultural values? Moreover,
deliberative cultures may not be possible when information is
unreliable. But since information is almost always unreliable to
some degree, the critic might reply that ideally the distinction
between deliberative and dedicated cultures tracks the distinc-
tion between open and closed societies. This may amount to a
mere stipulation that an open society is deliberative. If so, it
must be evaluated by determining whether the stipulation is
useful. I would argue that this stipulation is counterproductive
because by assimilating the distinction between open and closed
cultures to the distinction between deliberative and dedicated
cultures, we foreclose the possibility of understanding the caus-
al relations between openness and deliberation on the one hand
and closed and dedicated on the other. Though conceptually
distinct, openness may in part causally explain deliberative
cultures, while the feature of being closed may be a causal
condition of dedicated cultures.
B. Deliberativism in Education and American Constitutionalism
This distinction between deliberative and dedicated constructs
arises also in the context of education. We can distinguish be-
tween educational processes that encourage deliberative ratio-
nality and autonomy and those that encourage fidelity to dedi-
cated cultural values. Deliberative educational processes, of
course, cannot dispense with certain fixed elements, since a
deliberative culture has a particular past and context that must
be understood just as much as in dedicated cultures. In deliber-
ative cultures, these fixed elements are not dedicated because
they must be amenable to deliberative justification. An impor-
tant difference between deliberative and dedicated cultures is
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that the latter is in some important sense content with itself,
while the former seeks to challenge, criticize and refine its
values. This description is not biased in favor of a deliberative
culture, since challenging one's culture is not always good, and
being content with one's culture is not always bad.
The distinction between deliberative and dedicated concepts
will often apply in different ways to the same item. For exam-
ple, it could be argued that the United States Constitution is a
deliberative document concerning white males, but not concern-
ing Native Americans, African Americans, women, and others.
For these groups, one would have to say that the Constitution
was almost entirely a dedicated document. None of these groups
were permitted to engage in a deliberative process during the
creation and ratification of the Constitution, nor could they
participate in deliberative politics afterward. This shows that a
document or system of government can be deliberative for some
people and dedicated for others.95 Moreover, certain parts of a
generally deliberative document can be dedicated. For example,
the United States Senate is arguably a dedicated branch of
government, since there is no obvious deliberative reason for
supporting regional representation.96
C. The Perils of Deliberativism
The distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures is
intended to represent two distinct strategies for living, two dif-
ferent ways of experiencing-and acting in-the world. This
article does not presume that either style is inherently superior
to the other. In Anglo-American culture, however, dedicated
95. Of course, this assumes (perhaps erroneously) that we can determine whether
a document is deliberative or dedicated merely by understanding its text without
application to actual cases-as if the text had an internal strategy for problem solv-
ing that could be characterized as deliberative or dedicated independently of its appli-
cation to the relevant social groups.
96. One could argue that the several states or regions have unique problems and
interests, and that the best way for these to be assured of a hearing in deliberation
is to create a branch of government that can protect these problems and interests. In
this view, a Senate representing disadvantaged groups may be equally legitimate. See
Will Kymlicka, Group Representation in Canadian Politics, in EQUITY & COMMuNITY:
THE CHARTER, INTEREST ADVOcACY AND REPRESENTATION 61, 65 (F. Leslie Seidle ed.,
1993).
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reasoning is often denigrated as unthinking, shallow, or anti-
thetical to human flourishing. Nevertheless, dedicated cultures
are at least predictable, stable, and promise to provide uniquely
correct solutions to cultural conflicts. Moreover, dedicated cul-
tures attempt to preserve group identity and loyalty and permit
the communication of cultural messages through an identifiable
and reliable process.
Dedicated cultures also provide an attractive conception of
security and social continuity. In Alasdair MacIntyre's childhood
culture, for example, "[w]hat mattered ... were particular
loyalties and ties to kinship and the land. To be just was to
play one's assigned role in the life of one's local community.
Each person's identity derived from the person's place in their
community and in the conflicts and arguments that constituted
its ongoing... history."97 Moreover, a dedicated culture "con-
sists in the temporary saturation of his first-person perspective
with a sense of the permanence of the social world .... Tradi-
tion provides one of the ways in which men acquire the sense
of their continuity."9 Dedicated cultures provide social customs
and ceremonies that anchor individuals in predictable, gratify-
ing ways of life. For these and other reasons, this article does
not presume that deliberative cultures are superior to dedicated
ones. Moreover, independent reasons exist for doubting the
superioritj of the deliberative attitude.99
97. GIOVANNA BORRADORI, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHER: CONVERSATIONS WITH
QUINE, DAVIDSON, PUTNAM, NoziCK, DANTo, RORTY, CAVELL, MACINTYRE, AND KUHN
140 (Rosanna Crocitto trans., 1994). MacIntrye's description depicts a premodern soci-
ety, but I do not believe that is what he has in mind.
98. Scruton, supra note 71, at 220.
99. A person might live a mixed life, embracing dedicated values in some areas of
her life and deliberative values in others. For example, a person might adopt dedicat-
ed values as an expression of her religious devotion and deliberative values in her
occupation as a rocket scientist. The distinction between deliberative and dedicated
concepts is not a dichotomy between people who use deliberative values exclusively,
on the one hand, and those using only dedicated values, on the other hand. Never-
theless, unless there is a principled way to determine when one paradigm is appro-
priate and the other not, this sort of compartmentalization or bifurcation can be self-
stultifying. Moreover, if there is such a principle it must be justified deliberatively.
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1. Anguish
Too much deliberation in one's practical life can result in
anguish and torment.' 0 Because deliberation knows no inher-
ent closure, one can never enjoy the peace, certainty, and pre-
dictability that closure brings. Since deliberation is inextricably
interwoven with autonomy, the deliberative attitude must con-
tinue to engage in self-criticism, self-reflection, and the continu-
al revision and refinement of personal and collective strategies
of problem-solving.' Indeed, the deliberative attitude praises
these virtues because they will enable the individual to become
self-regulating." 2 The problem of closure arises because the
deliberative attitude does not itself appear to provide a prin-
ciple for determining when enough deliberation is enough.0 3
It is not obvious that such a principle can be constructed for an
individual's practical reasoning. Yet, even if such a principle
exists for the individual, it is unlikely that we can construct
such a principle across persons.' In other words, one high
100. See KYMLICKA, supra note 8, at 61 (asserting that "this vaunting of 'free
individuality' will result not in the confident affirmation and pursuit of worthy cours-
es of action but rather an existential uncertainty and anomie, in doubt about the
very value of one's life and its purposes.").
101. Sometimes, an unintended consequence of trying to lead a deliberatively au-
tonomous life is becoming obsessive about the reasons-their strength, scope, and
ranking-one has for one's values and life plans. This obsession represents the pos-
sibility of a silent pathology for many people. Of course, it is true that the delibera-
tive attitude does not entail such an obsession.
102. Just as a person who single-mindedly pursues pleasure is often brought to
despair and ruin, a slavish devotion to deliberation can be similarly debilitating. Both
dangers can be prevented by devising pleasure-maximizing or autonomy-maximizing
rules as opposed to trying to determine which action maximizes pleasure or autonomy
every time one decides to act.
103. The deliberativist might reply that closure occurs when the deliberative at-
titude is threatened by continued deliberation. But when does that occur? The deliber-
ative attitude is also threatened by premature closure; consequently, a deliberative
personality must continually monitor her deliberative system to determine when clo-
sure is neither premature nor overdue. Even short of obsession, there are severe costs
to this process.
A deliberativist might reply that this pathology does not indict deliberativism
per se, only its incorrect deployment. But since the problem of determining when one
reaches the limits of deliberativism is itself a deliberative problem and indeterminate,
the risk of this pathology remains.
104. See Lipkin, supra note 40.
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Another cost of the deliberative attitude is the assumption of
responsibility that comes with a commitment to the deliberative
attitude. Deliberation is directed towards getting things right
for oneself and others. The deliberative attitude is ultimate; at
least in theory it defers to no further principle. In this way a
deliberative person might be condemned to be free.'0 5 Depend-
ing upon how well one can endure the strain of deliberation, a
person might choose one last deliberative act by deciding to live
a dedicated life instead. Everyone knows someone who just can-
not stop reevaluating his decisions and second-guessing himself.
The allure of a dedicated life might be irresistible to such a
person, if only he can claim it."7
The problem of closure can be generalized beyond personal
decisions because deliberativism "renders our social and moral
ties too open to dissolution by rational criticism."' Dedicated
values, on the other hand, provide a kind of closure, or better,
an independent procedure for resolving social and moral issues
that one can adopt in advance. Everyone risks the uncertainty
that leading a life of deliberative autonomy engenders. We can
avoid this by deciding in advance to adopt dedicated values.
The question of whether to adopt the deliberative attitude or
instead to adopt a system of dedicated norms and values is an
open question that might not lend itself to general or final answers.'1°
105. In a similar fashion, Catherine MacKinnon has described postmodernism as
"discourse unto death." Catherine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is
a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991) ("The postmodern ver-
sion of the relation between theory and practice is discourse unto death.").
106. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM 52 (1950) ("[M]an
being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders;
he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being.").
107. The phenomenon of a deliberative person "converting" to a dedicated life style
is not uncommon.
108. Alasdair Maclntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 209
(R. Beiner ed., 1995).
109. Once we demystify the modernist conception of reason which originally gener-
ated the deliberative attitude, we begin to see the deliberative attitude in a different
light. It is a strategy for cultural inquiry that has benefits and burdens just as dedi-
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A defender of the deliberative attitude might reply that
choosing a dedicated life requires deliberation even if only for
one last deliberative decision. Since a deliberative deci-
sion-how one should live-is made in any case, it is incumbent
upon us to decide well. Thus, we cannot escape deliberative
reasoning: we can only decide to do it well or poorly. Doing it
well requires that we keep our deliberative options open. How-
ever, the deliberativist overlooks the fact that no one engages
in deliberative autonomy in all situations. The question here
then becomes how often and in what kinds of circumstances
should we deliberate. Of course, that too involves a deliberative
choice. But even if the deliberative attitude must play some
role in one's system of practical reasoning, one can still choose
a system that is predominantly dedicated. If so, then the reply
establishes only that deliberation is required in some circum-
stances. It does not require anyone to adopt a predominantly
deliberative set of norms and values.
These problems do not constitute dispositive evidence against
the deliberative attitude. They are intended to show only that
the distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures does
not presume the superiority of the deliberative attitude."0 De-
liberative cultures object to dedicated constructs because they
do not foster self-criticism, self-determination, and so forth.
Moreover, dedicated systems fail to prepare you for contempo-
rary democratic society. In short, dedicated cultures fail because
they are not deliberative, but this does not provide a non-circu-
lar argument against dedicated cultures.
cated systems of cultural inquiry have benefits and burdens. Only from an Archime-
dean perspective can we embrace the deliberative attitude and reject dedicated cul-
tures in advance. Abandoning such foundationalist devices entails rejecting the notion
that deliberative systems are always superior to dedicated systems, no matter the
content of the system, the historical era in which they exist, and the person and the
community adopting them.
110. For an argument that can be redeployed in the present context as an objec-
tion to deliberative cultures, see MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 5-42 (1991).
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3. The Identity and Justification of a System of Norms
We should distinguish between the identity or characteriza-
tion of a system of norms and values and its justification. How
we identify or characterize a system of norms depends upon the
social expectations that naturally flow from the characteriza-
tion. For example, when we identify a system of norms as de-
liberative, we invite others to systematically criticize, revise,
and attempt to falsify the system's norms. When we identify a
system of norms as dedicated, we expect allegiance. How we
identify or characterize a system of norms is one thing; how we
justify that system is another. We can therefore have a dedicat-
ed system of norms that is justified deliberatively, and we can
have a system of deliberative norms that are justified by ap-
pealing to dedicated factors. The United States military is a
dedicated system that in principle has a deliberative justifica-
tion, whereas a system of religious norms committed to the
deliberative attitude because it is the word of God is an exam-
ple of a system of norms characterized deliberatively, but whose
ultimate justification appeals to a dedicated factor, namely, the
existence and will of God."' Of course, neither example is a
case of a fully deliberative or a fully dedicated system, and it is
these ideal types that concern us here.
The distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures is
a distinction between two types or conceptions of comprehensive
doctrines of the good. The virtues of the deliberative attitude
are self-determination, self-realization, and self-authentication.
The virtues of the dedicated attitude are closure, predictability,
stability, and security. It seems to follow that since liberalism
is committed to the deliberative attitude, it incorporates a con-
ception of the good."' If so, liberalism cannot then be neutral
111. This example assumes that the existence of God is not subject to deliberative
proof. The example fails if you believe that deliberative proof can justify a belief in
God. In that case, the identity and justification of a (religious) cultural system may
be fully deliberative.
112. In order to deny that liberalism incorporates a conception of the good, it can
be argued that liberalism does not presuppose the deliberative attitude, and therefore
does not presuppose a conception of the good. Yet, no one can deny that liberal jus-
tification is committed to the deliberative attitude in the political context. If so, the
deliberative attitude presupposed in political justification is itself a conception of the
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concerning different conceptions of the good and may be unable
to tolerate different conceptions of the good not based on the
deliberative attitude."' Let us now explore this critical issue.
Ill. LIBERALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF THE GOOD
A. Does Liberalism Contain a Conception of the Good?
The distinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures
does not depend upon an answer to the question of whether
liberalism contains a conception of the good." Nevertheless,
an answer to this question is required to show that liberalism
cannot tolerate dedicated cultures."' In this section I discuss
the issue of whether liberalism contains a conception of the
good, and if so, whether liberalism unfairly benefits liberals in
constructing principles of public reason."'
good.
113. There are two different strains of liberalism which when distinguished repre-
sent two different kinds of liberal theory. The first emphasizes neutrality, the other
pluralism. RAZ, supra note 78, at 132-33. Far from neutral, liberal pluralism insists
that the state should provide the conditions for a multiplicity of different comprehen-
sive conceptions of the good. Nevertheless, liberal pluralism might be neutral with
respect to each individual conception of the good.
114. The concept of the good refers to a person's 'ultimate values. A complete an-
swer to the question of whether liberalism contains a comprehensive conception of the
good must address these questions: First, is the deliberative attitude an intrinsic
good? In other words, is there something of value associated with the deliberative
attitude that cannot be explained by reference to its consequences? Second, how does
the deliberative attitude in political contexts differ from the deliberative attitude as a
constituent feature of the good? Third, is it possible or desirable to adopt the deliber-
ative attitude in political contexts only, while simultaneously embracing a highly
structured system of dedicated norms and values in one's social life?
115. Liberalism contains a conception of the good if any of the following are true:
(1) the liberal theory of the right presupposes a conception of the good; (2) the liberal
theory of the right contains a structural feature that is a constituent feature of a
conception of the good; or (3) people who adopt the deliberative attitude in their
social lives are systematically more likely to adopt the deliberative attitude in politi-
cal justification.
116. According to Rawls, "in democratic society public reason is the reason of equal
citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one
another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution." JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 214 (1993). This is a narrower conception of public reason than Kant's
because Kant believed that "It]he public use of one's reason must always be free, and
it alone can bring about enlightenment." IIMANUIEL KANT, What is Enlightenment?, in
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 41-42 (1983).
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Liberalism contains a conception of the good because it is
committed to the deliberative attitude."' Taking the delibera-
tive attitude seriously entails adopting it as the principle for
motivating and justifying your choice of substantive goals."'
This means that whatever your substantive goals concerning
health, knowledge, wealth, and social benefits, you express and
structure these substantive values through deliberative rational-
ity and deliberative autonomy. In short, your substantive goals
are not merely important in themselves, but rather in how they
are motivated and justified by the deliberative attitude. This
makes the deliberative attitude a constituent feature of your
system of substantive values, and arguably more important
than the substantive values themselves.
1. Comprehensive Liberalism and Political Liberalism
Since the deliberative attitude is a constituent feature of the
good, liberals are necessarily benefited by adopting the delibera-
tive attitude in the context of political justification."' Let us
call the liberal who embraces the deliberative attitude as a
constituent feature of both political reason and social reason
"the comprehensive liberal," and let us call "the political liberal"
one who embraces the deliberative attitude as a constituent
feature of political reason alone.2 ° Does the comprehensive
liberal benefit from the deliberative attitude in political dis-
117. The inescapability of the deliberative attitude as a constituent feature of the
good is argued in greater detail in Lipkin, supra note 3.
118. Moreover, if liberalism is preferred because it avoids conflict or strife, then
you will embrace liberalism if the avoidance of conflict and strife are your primary
values. See Seyla Benhabib, Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theory of Discursive
Legitimation, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 143, 146-47 (Nancy L. Rosenblum,
ed., 1989). This hardly shows that liberalism is not dependent on at least a partial
conception of the good.
119. Political reason refers to the basic structure of society, while social reason re-
fers to personal and associational activities in non-constitutional and non-governmen-
tal contexts.
120. This departs from Rawls' use of political liberalism. According to Rawls, the
political liberal is someone who accepts liberalism concerning public reason and politi-
cal justification, but whose conception of the good is irrelevant to political justifica-
tion. RAWLS, supra note 116. Since I believe liberalism contains a conception of the
good, I want to contrast the comprehensive liberal with a political liberal. To make
the appropriate contrast, the political liberal must embrace the deliberative attitude
concerning political justification, but reject it concerning her conception of the good.
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course in a way that the political liberal does not?' If she
does, then adopting the deliberative attitude in political con-
texts is neither neutral,2 nor impartial, nor merely the result
of an overlapping consensus.' Nor is the relationship be-
tween political reason and social reason contingent. Instead, the
deliberative attitude as the sine qua non is necessarily related
to social liberalism, and its adoption, therefore, unfairly favors
comprehensive liberals over political liberals.'
John Rawls, a champion of political liberalism, rejects this
conclusion by invoking the principle that the right is prior to
the good.' The theory of the right concerns those rights and
duties that follow from the most plausible conception of political
justification, while the theory of the good concerns those traits
of persons and states of affair that have moral value. According
121. As Kent Greenawalt puts it, "[1]iberal nonreligious comprehensive perspectives
are bound to 'suffer less' from a principle of [liberal] self-restraint than both religious
and nonreligious, non-liberal views. This difference may reasonably be thought to
involve a kind of inequity." Kent Greenawalt, On Public Reason, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 669, 688 (1994).
122. See MACINTYRE, supra note 18, at 345 (arguing that the liberal's conception of
practical reasoning "and the theory ... of justice ... are not neutral with respect to
rival and conflicting theories of the human good."). The claim here is that even if
liberalism wanted to, it cannot escape a bias in its own favor because "Itihe starting
points of liberal theorizing are never neutral as between conceptions of the human
good; they are always liberal starting points." Id.
123. See RAWLS, supra note 116, at 133-72.
124. The comprehensive liberal expresses the deliberative attitude as the unifying
principle of her theoretical and practical life. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 276 (1990).
Hence, the deliberative attitude represents a way of life, a technique of being in the
world. Id. at 256 (asserting that freedom is a way of life). This way of life "contains
within itself the resources it needs to declare and to defend a conception of the good
life that is in no way truncated or contemptible." William Galston, Defending Liberal-
ism, 76 AMt. POL. SCI. REV. 621, 629 (1982). Not everyone, of course, concurs in the
desirability of the deliberative attitude.
125. RAWLS, supra note 54. But see Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of
Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 15 (1990) (arguing that endorsing
Rawls' theory of justice achieves stability and unity and that makes the theory true).
So called political liberalism applies to the public, political arena. See RAWIS, supra
note 114; see also Bruce Ackerman, supra note 10. But see Bruce W. Brower, The
Limits of Public Reason, 91 J. PHIL. 5, 15 (1994) (arguing that "Rawlsian arguments
will be acceptable only to those who have already approved the contractarian ideal of
the reasonable person").
In Rawls' terminology, my point is that a political liberal who integrates the
deliberative attitude throughout her political life and her social life has an advantage
over a political liberal who adopts the deliberative attitude in her political life only.
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to Rawls, the theory of the right is independent of the theory of
the good.12 In other words, political justification does not pre-
suppose any particular conception of the good, or comprehensive
metaphysical, epistemological or ethical doctrine. Given a plu-
rality of different conceptions of the good, reasonable peo-
ple-people who regard themselves as free and equal, and who
have a sense of justice and a particular conception of the
good-will construct a political domain governed by fairness and
impartiality, permitting or guaranteeing a plurality of compre-
hensive doctrines about the meaning of life.127
Rawls' goal is to show how people with incompatible concep-
tions of the good can agree on fundamental principles of politi-
cal justification. In the Rawlsian framework, this goal must be
possible for liberal democracy to function at all. In order for
126. But see Will Kymlicka, Rawls on Teleology and Deontology, 17 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 173, 184-85 (1988) (a thought-provoking article arguing that this view is mis-
placed).
127. Rawls adopts the distinction between "pluralism as such" (or pluralism in
fact) and reasonable pluralism. Pluralism as such constitutes "a mere historical condi-
tion that may soon pass away." RAWLS, supra note 6, at 36. While reasonable plural-
ism "is a permanent feature of the public culture," pluralism as such implies that
free institutions tend to encourage a variety of different views based on idiosyncratic
features of peoples' points of view. Id. Reasonable pluralism "is the fact that among
the views that develop are a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines." Joshua
Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, in THE IDEA OF DEMOcRACY 270,
280. (David Copp et al. eds., 1993). Rawls does not explain his conception of reason-
ableness, but Cohen attempts a definition, according to which [an understanding of
value is fully reasonable just in case its adherents are stably disposed to affirm it as
they acquire new information and subject it to critical reflection." RAWLS, supra note
at 116, at 28-81. In my view, both Rawls and Cohen need to say more about the
notion of reasonableness. Interpreting Cohen's conception of reasonableness narrowly,
only few comprehensive views will be reasonable, while if we construe the critical
terms expansively, almost everyone's view is reasonable. The problem is trying to
formulate a conception of reasonableness that is neither too narrow nor too expansive,
nor circular. But what can such a conception be based on? A reasonable conception of
reasonableness? Since the concept of reasonableness plays such a significant role in
most characterizations of liberalism, we need a thorough analysis of this concept
before we can determine whether it is successfully used in constructing liberal theory.
The existence of a plurality of values does not itself entail liberalism, nor does
it entail any other political theory. See generally George Crowder, Pluralism and
Liberalism, 42 POL. STUD. 293 (1994). Moreover, liberal theorists typically advocate a
plurality of liberal values, but '[w]hy should we accept that the plurality of values
available to us is, on the whole, a plurality of liberal values?" Id. at 304. Moreover,
to justify the restriction, it might be necessary for liberalism to embrace historicism.
Id. at 304-05. But see Isaiah Berlin & Bernard Williams, Pluralism and Liberalism: A
Reply, 42 POL. STUD. 306 (1994).
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Rawls' project to succeed, he must adopt a narrow conception of
the independence of the right and the good. Indeed, Rawls
appears to believe that only if principles of political justification
logically presuppose principles of the good is the right depen-
dent upon the good. There are, however, alternative conceptions
of the dependency of the right and the good. The right is de-
pendent upon the good when a particular type of person-with
her particular conception of the good-is drawn to and benefits
from a particular conception of the right. If comprehensive
liberals tend to adopt a particular conception of political justifi-
cation, and if they benefit over others in doing so, we have
reason to believe, barring an alternative explanation, that their
conception of the good is more closely allied with political justi-
fication than are other conceptions of the good.
What benefits does the comprehensive liberal gain from
adopting the deliberative attitude that are unavailable to the
political liberal? Comprehensive liberals can justify principles of
political reason all the way down, whereas political liberals can
justify principles of political reason deliberatively, but must jus-
tify their conception of the good in dedicated terms or not at
all. This precludes political liberals from achieving a unity in
their conception of justification throughout their public and
nonpublic lives, as well as throughout their system of practical
reasoning generally.
2. The Problem of Unity
Two problems arise in this context. The first problem is a
conceptual and moral point about the advantages of comprehen-
sive liberalism over political liberalism. The advantage is that
the comprehensive liberal is afforded the opportunity of achiev-
ing a unity between political reason and social reason not af-
forded to the political liberal.2 Because she uses the delibera-
tive attitude in both political and social contexts, the compre-
128. This type of unity is an important value if one endorses the idea of a struc-
tured, integrated sense of self. The more bifurcated one's life, the less one has an
integrated sense of self. A truncated sense of self requires principles for ranking or
balancing the disparate parts of the self, and such principles are hard to find. The
deliberative attitude is designed to integrate the disparate parts of one's life and
therefore expresses the unity of the self.
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hensive liberal requires only one conception of justification for
the central areas of her life. Moreover, the comprehensive liber-
al achieves a structure to her consciousness, a unification of the
public and private not available to the political liberal.
Liberalism is often commended or criticized for embracing a
separation of the public and the private, but in one sense com-
prehensive liberalism does not embrace this dichotomy at all.
Instead, it seeks the simplicity of a single, though sophisticated,
attitude unifying the public and the private or the political and
the social into one perspective. Comprehensive liberalism seeks
the unity of perception, thought, and action in terms of the
deliberative attitude. Everything the comprehensive liberal
experiences, reflects on, and decides to do can be explained by
the deliberative attitude. In short, the comprehensive liberal is
committed to the deliberative attitude not only for its instru-
mental rewards, but more importantly, for the constituent role
the deliberative attitude plays in unifying her conceptions of
the right and the good.
By contrast, the political liberal, who is a non-liberal concern-
ing social reason, is compelled to live a bifurcated life. She
must accept the deliberative attitude in political justification
and dedicated attitudes in social justification. In other words,
she adopts the deliberative attitude when justifying the basic
structure of society and dedicated attitudes when determining
the meaning of her life. There is a price to pay for this bifur-
cation: one's deepest commitments must be suppressed or dis-
guised or, at best, become truncated. In the context of political
justification, political liberalism compels individuals committed
to dedicated social values to lead closeted political lives denying
their dedicated attitudes. In the context of political justification,
political liberals must approach political questions obliquely and
incompletely. The comprehensive liberal, on the other hand, can
express her deepest commitments by embracing the deliberative
attitude because it is this attitude that unifies her political and
social lives. Liberalism grants the benefits of unity and coher-
ence in one's life to the comprehensive liberal but withholds
them from the political liberal. More importantly, political liber-
alism takes a stance on the formal dimension of a person's
conception of the good or comprehensive view of life." Only
129. Consider Miriam Galston's remarks:
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comprehensive doctrines that permit the bifurcation of political
justice and conceptions of the good need apply. That in itself is
part of a particular conception of the good.
3. The Problem of Authenticity
The second problem can be called, absent a better term, the
problem of authenticity: Does liberalism encourage people to act
sincerely on their political principles? 130 The problem of au-
thenticity directly implicates the stability of a liberal regime.
Since a constituent feature of the comprehensive liberal's con-
ception of the right and her conception of the good is the delib-
erative attitude, embracing this attitude in political justification
while denying a role to the concept of the good generally breeds
suspicion and distrust, and therefore threatens the stability of
democratic government. The political liberal perceives the role
the deliberative attitude plays in the comprehensive liberal's
life and begins to believe that liberalism is skewed in the
comprehensive liberal's favor. For the comprehensive liberal, the
deliberative attitude structures, unifies and integrates both her
conception of public reason and her conception of the good. In
short, it structures the comprehensive liberal's practical reason-
ing generally. It is little wonder that the political liberal is
likely to become suspicious of the comprehensive liberal and
conclude that political liberalism is a charade. More important-
ly, the comprehensive liberal should want political liberals to be
as deeply committed to their common political concepts. 3' On-
ly in this way is the appropriate force behind social unity possi-
ble. 32
Rawls denies the label "reasonable" to any comprehensive views that see
political principles as derived from or dictating to moral, psychological,
religious, or metaphysical views. Thus, Rawls excludes from his democrat-
ic society any comprehensive view that sees political theory as part of
and inseparable from a comprehensive view.
Miriam Galston, Rawlsian Dualism and the Autonomy of Political Thought, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1842, 1851 (1994).
130. Cf. S. A. Lloyd, Relativizing Rawls, 69 C0I.-KENT L. REv. 709, 729 (1994)
("We may also think it is a good thing that others be able to act authentically on
their political commitments, for reasons of both moral integrity and psychological
health.") (emphasis added).
131. See id.
132. See id. Rawls maintains that the stability of a political conception of justice
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The problem for authenticity arises because adopting the
deliberative attitude is or, at least, appears to be taking sides
in the battle of the conception of the good. 133 Typically, the
deliberative attitude generates substantive answers to questions
of political organization that are at odds with dedicated an-
swers to these questions. Consequently, those who must sup-
press their conception of the good often feel that political liber-
alism is unfairly skewed toward the comprehensive liberal,
disadvantaging those with dedicated conceptions of the
good.'13
lies in its support from an overlapping consensus. In this view, the same political
conception will be embedded in different comprehensive doctrines. Thus, political rea-
son will have the appropriate force and unity. But this assumes that the political
conception will be embedded in these different comprehensive doctrines in the same
way and to the same extent. Nowhere does Rawls demonstrate that this is so. If it is
not so, there is no guarantee that stability and unity can be achieved through this
consensus.
133. While not endorsing it, Nagel gives a good description of this distrust.
[Diefenders of strong toleration tend to place a high value on individual
freedom, and limitation on state interference based on a higher-order
impartiality among values that tends to promote individual freedom to
which they are partial. This leads to the suspicion that the escalation to
a higher level of impartiality is a sham, and that all the pleas for tol-
eration and restraint really disguise a campaign to put the state behind
a secular, individualistic, and libertine morality-against religion and in
favor of sex, roughly.
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 156 (1991). Nagel goes on to say that a
liberal "should at least be able to convince himself that [others] have reason to accept
certain principles of political toleration and impartiality. . . ." Id. at 157. The problem
here is that in the important, controversial cases no reliable procedure exists to rule
out self-deception and bad faith. Without such a procedure we are left only with a
case by case process that engenders suspicion and distrust.
On another occasion Nagel writes: "Liberal impartiality is not in competition
with more specific values as one conception of the good among others. If it were, it
would be unintelligible. . . ." Nagel, supra note 28, at 239. According to Nagel, it is a
mistake to think that liberalism requires "its adherents to step outside liberalism
itself to compromise with antiliberal positions. It purports to provide a maximally
impartial standard of right which has priority over more specialized conceptions in
determining what may be imposed on us by our fellow humans, and vice versa." Id.
Liberal impartiality may or may not be "in competition with more specific values as
one conception of the good among others." Id. But the deliberative attitude is in com-
petition with other conceptions of the good. That is what makes it an attractive atti-
tude; it promises a life that endorses the process of choice more than the object cho-
sen.
134. Joshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1503, 1519-20
(1994). More specifically, "the case for stability . . . depends upon a set of moral
commitments and self-understandings that some members of a well-ordered society
will reasonably reject." Id.
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Political liberals might contend that whenever questions of
justification arise they always preclude reference to the good
because justification requires the original position. And the
original position is neither liberal nor non-liberal, but uses a
neutral conception of deliberation that avoids characterization
in these terms. Consequently, justification in terms of the origi-
nal position cannot presuppose anyone's conception of the
good.' But this reply simply denies, without argument, that
the deliberative attitude is a constituent feature of a conception
of the good. If a particular conception of political justification is
more likely to be chosen by a people having a particular con-
ception of the good, and if these same people are benefited by
that conception of political justification, then we have reason to
say that this conception of political justification is skewed to-
ward people having that conception of the good.
The political liberal will not deny that principles of public
reason might benefit some groups over others. Instead, the
political liberal replies that this overlooks an important distinc-
tion between justing the principles of justice and the conse-
quences of adopting these principles.'36 In this view, liberalism
need not, and perhaps, cannot provide consequential neutrality;
on the other hand, it must be justificatorily neutral. Is this
distinction between the justificatory and consequentialist fea-
tures of public reason dispositive? In adopting a certain concep-
tion of public reason, should not its predictable consequences be
relevant to its desirability?3 When justificatory neutrality
continually has nonneutral consequences and nonneutral conse-
135. Rawls contends that "accepting the political conception does not presuppose
accepting any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine;
rather, the political conception presents itself as a reasonable conception for the basic
structure alone. .. ." RAWLS, supra note 116, at 175. But see Cohen, supra note 132,
at 1527 ("Even if the conception presents itself as political, accepting it may still
presuppose accepting a comprehensive view if a single view provides the only reasons
for accepting the political conception.") (emphasis added).
136. Will Kyrnlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETmcs 883,
884-86 (1989). According to Kymlicka, a liberal state is sufficiently neutral when it
fails to 'justify its actions by reference to some public ranking of intrinsic value of
different ways of life, for there is no public ranking to refer to. This kind of neutrali-
ty is consistent with the legitimate nonneutral consequences of cultural competition
and individual responsibility." Id. at 886.
137. Isn't it irrational to evaluate a conception of public reason without considering
its predictable consequences? Cf. Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,
103 ETHICS 48, 54 (1992).
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quences of the same kind, it is unclear how this distinction
helps. If liberal justification continually has deliberative conse-
quences, isn't the distinction between justification and conse-
quences artificial? But more importantly, how do we distinguish
between the character of political justification and the character
of a conception of the good? If the character of both includes
the deliberative attitude, it seems to follow that the deliberative
attitude integrates the comprehensive liberal's conception of the
right and her conception of the good. Moreover, it also appears
that the relationship between the comprehensive liberal's con-
ception of the right and her conception of the good is more than
a contingent relationship; instead, the conception of the right
and the conception of the good are non-contingently unified by
the deliberative attitude.
138
Joshua Cohen attempts to defuse the objection "that the ideal
of deliberative democracy is objectionably sectarian because it
depends on a particular view of the good life-an ideal of active
citizenship.""' He argues that the good is relevant to liberal-
ism either because it is part of liberal justification or because it
is required for stability.' Cohen grants that a conception of
the good may be required for stability, but insists that "[a]
political conception is objectionably sectarian only if its justifi-
cation depends on a particular view of the human good, and not
simply because its stability is contingent on widespread agree-
ment on the value of certain activities and aspirations."' For
national allegiance to be part of the justification of a political
democracy, patriotic devotion may be required for its stabili-
ty.'4 If patriotic stability is truly required for a democracy in
all practically conceivable circumstances, it is unclear how it
avoids inclusion in the justificatory framework. Moreover, as a
conception of the good, patriotic devotion, when acted upon
through the legal and political institutions of the state, may
burden conceptions of the good not including patriotic devotion
or those explicitly opposed to such a conception. The real test of
138. If this distinction is viable, distrust and suspicion concerning public reason
will naturally arise when those not sharing the comprehensive deliberative approach
find themselves on the short end of the consequences of public reason.
139. Cohen, supra note 64, at 27.
140. Id.




sectarianism should be whether those values associated with
the political conception under evaluation burdens other concep-
tions of the good. Since this will almost always be so, the
charge of sectarianism must be taken much more seriously.
This explains the traditional liberal's rejection of the idea of
a liberal conception of the good. If there is no such conception,
then the problem of authenticity-appearing to favor the
liberal's conception of the good--drops out. The liberal's concep-
tion of the good cannot be unfairly favored or unduly benefited
because the liberal, qua liberal, can have no good. Any concep-
tion of the good the liberal assumes is conceptually and morally
independent of political liberalism. If the liberal's conception of
the right was conceptually and morally independent of the good,
then political liberalism as a theory of the right favors no con-
ception of the good. However, the kind of justification that
occurs in the original position is deliberative, and deliberative
people are likely to adopt this type of justification and will
benefit from adopting it. When a particular kind of justification
is so intertwined with a particular conception of the good, one
is warranted in saying that it politically if not logically presup-
poses that conception.
The theory of the good answers the question "what sort of
culture human beings have good reason to seek to fashion for
themselves and their descendants, or as a theory of what sort
of human beings it is desirable in principle for cultures to con-
tinue to form.. . ."' The theory of the good must determine
whether the bifurcation between the political and the personal
is an attractive feature of political liberalism's moral psycholo-
gy. This conception of politics sacrifices unity and coherence in
one's moral personality.' In answering the question "what
kind of person is it desirable to be?" liberalism's answer must
be the kind of person committed to the deliberative attitude.
This renders the deliberative attitude a particular conception of
the good. The deliberative attitude unifies and structures the
comprehensive liberal's conceptions of the right and the good.
143. John Dunn, Social Theory, Social Understanding, and Political Action, in
SOCIAL THEORY & POLITICAL PRACTICE 109, 112 (Christopher Lloyd ed., 1983).
144. See Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1936, 1941-44 (1994) (arguing that a theory that sacrifices integrity for Rawis' concep-
tion of civility will not be widely acceptable).
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Hence, it is difficult to understand how someone committed to
the deliberative attitude concerning the good could fail to adopt
the deliberative attitude in the context of political justification.
Consequently, the comprehensive liberal benefits more from
political liberalism than does the political liberal because the
connection between the comprehensive liberal's conception of
the right and her conception of the good is conceptual, not
accidental.
Rawls believes that reasonable people will be drawn to politi-
cal liberalism, not merely deliberative people.45 And reason-
able people can have different conceptions of the good, even
dedicated conceptions of the good. However, Rawls employs an
unanalyzed conception of reasonableness, one that must be
specified in greater detail if reasonableness is used to connect
the political culture to principles of justice." Even if Rawls
succeeds, he can have no realistic hope of transposing this ar-
gument to international multicultural contexts, since no shared
political culture exists in that context." Moreover, it is very
dangerous to rely on the notion of reasonableness as the basis
for determining which conceptions of political justification are
acceptable. The common tendency is to regard the dominant
group's conception of reasonableness, whether liberal or non-
liberal, as a constraint of reasonableness generally and there-
fore as a constraint on political justification without an inde-
pendent argument for this conclusion."
Rawls uses reasonableness to achieve a form of neutrality
that he earlier believed was nonpolitical.'49 This new political
methodology can achieve moral neutrality only in highly homo-
geneous and localized contexts or only in the sense of a modus
145. Rawls wants to derive political justification from our political culture in which
free and equal people must adopt some scheme of social cooperation. The concept of
free and equal people seeking social cooperation seems conspicuously liberal and de-
liberative from the start. How can that be the neutral basis of political liberalism?
146. Basically, Rawls' conception of reasonableness centers around people regarding
themselves as free and equal with a sense of justice and a conception of the good.
147. See Onora O'Neill, Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism, 98 ETHICS
705, 716-17 (1988).
148. See Jean Hampton, The Moral Commitments of Liberalism, in THE IDEA OF
DEMOCRACY, 292, 309 (David Copp et al. eds., 1993) ("It is easy for any powerful
group to insist that its society's standards of what is reasonable and rational justify
only its views of the world.").
149. RAWLS, supra note 54.
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vivendi."5 ' Consequently, liberal justification is not neutral be-
cause it incorporates the deliberative attitude, and the delibera-
tive attitude is a constituent feature of a liberal conception of
the good. " '
Liberalism must be defended, not as a theory morally prior
to any theory of the Good, but as a component of such a
theory, or as one value or set of values among a larger set.
That is, the princip[al] values of liberalism, individual au-
tonomy, and political and legal neutrality vis-&-vis lifestyles
will find their place-and their limits-among the compet-
ing, and at times compelling, values of welfare, truth,
150. As Hampton observes:
Either Rawls defends his theory of justice in a way that is genuinely
morally neutral by arguing that the ideas from which it is deduced are
accepted by the populace-in which case the public charter of the society
turns into a mere modus vivendi based on beliefs that happened to be
held by the people today and that they might abandon tomorrow; or he
defends them as correct . . . in which case his defense of liberal values
presupposes the truth of a comprehensive metaphysical view that in-
cludes them, and implicitly rejects the idea that a liberal democratic
society can take a neutral stand on every value-issue.
Hampton, supra note 148, at 309, Hampton believes that "when Rawls suggests that
his 'reasonableness' principle of legitimating political coercion is derived from assump-
tions of human freedom and equality, his rhetoric suggests his (in my view legiti-
mate) intolerance of the views of those who would repudiate these assumptions." Id.
at 310. Now Hampton's view might be the only one left standing after considering
the alternatives. Nevertheless, it is puzzling why Hampton does not appear to recog-
nize that this conclusion is troubling. Simply put, is there no more compelling concep-
tion of tolerance that either permits us to tolerate the intolerant, or at least to un-
derstand in a principled fashion why we need not bother? Hampton might reply that
we can explain the latter by indicating that toleration cannot survive if we allow
those who repudiate its assumptions to destroy our system of tolerance. But this begs
the question against fascists, communists, and Social Darwinists. Perhaps this is as
far as we go. Perhaps we must conclude that liberal toleration is a very bad system
because it cannot refute these other perspectives. Perhaps it is the worst system of
political organization, except for the rest. See id. at 311.
151. Although the character of liberal justification might not necessarily commit
one to a particular conception of the good, if only certain kinds of people having a
particular conception of the good are inclined to adopt liberal justification, then lib-
eral justification is skewed in favor of that kind of good. Consider:
The objection to the original position was not that its very statement
reveals it to be part of a liberal philosophy of life but rather that citi-
zens will be drawn to it-will find it a reasonable device for settling on
principles of justice-only if they endorse such a philosophy. So, too, even
if the formulation of a political conception is freed from objectionable
sectarianism, it may still win support only from adherents to a single
comprehensive doctrine or a narrow range of such doctrines.
Cohen, supra note 134, at 1526.
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desert, friendship, love, community, tradition, and so
forth.6
2
In other words, if individuals committed to the above virtues as
part of their conception of the good embrace deliberative justifi-
cation, then that is evidence, barring an alternative explana-
tion, that deliberative justification in the original position is
linked to the liberal conception of the good. Whether we de-
scribe this connection as one of presupposition or dependency is
irrelevant. The connection between political justification and the
concept of the good is close enough to justify charges that liber-
alism favors a particular conception of the good. 5 '
Liberal virtues are mirrored in political liberalism, and when
taken seriously have the tendency to insinuate themselves in
one's personal life. Moreover, once instilled into one's life these
virtues have a tendency to undermine dedicated values. A liber-
al is someone who holds back from judgment at least until
reasons have been given for the judgment and often until she
compares those reasons with reasons for alternative judgments.
In the most favorable picture, the liberal is a person who choos-
es to be self-legislating, to be committed to her own sense of
values, and to be authentic.M This involves being committed
to few, if any, dedicated values. When a liberal does embrace
dedicated values, it is only after deliberatively evaluating them
and granting them the liberal pedigree as a result of this delib-
eration. Consequently, how can liberalism tolerate dedicated
cultures?
152. Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 18, at 109. Liberalism also includes
such personal virtues as autonomy, critical reflection, independence, liberal pluralism,
respect, dignity, mutual trust, responsibility, and experimentation. See DAVID HELD,
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 270 (1987); see also William Galston, Defending Liberalism,
76 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 621, 628 (1982) (describing the elements in the liberal con-
ception of the good including social peace, the rule of law, diversity, inclusiveness,
decency, affluence, self-realization, approximate justice, truth, and privacy).
153. Moreover, in international contexts having no shared political culture, this
connection is sufficiently close to warrant the charge that liberalism fails to provide a
procedure for neutrally deciding on principles of political justification. Instead, liberal
principles of justification in international contexts smuggle in a liberal conception of
the good.
154. CHARLES TAYLOR, MuLuIcuLTRALIsM AND "THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION":




B. Liberalism and Tolerance
1. The Traditional Conception of Tolerance
The traditional conception of tolerance involves forbearance in
the sense of permitting the occurrence of something odious or
disparaged. According to this conception, a person tolerates only
something that she disapproves of or abhors. It makes no sense
according to this conception of tolerance for an individual to
tolerate something that she can see the point of, respect, or
appreciate. Let me suggest that the standard conception of
tolerance is an incomplete conception of tolerance, one that
almost every political theory can accept. As a philosophical
matter, tolerance is interesting when it relates to moral psy-
chology and depicts attitudes that reflect or mirror the basic
categories of the theory under examination. An interesting
conception of tolerance shows how the moral attitudes conspicu-
ous to the theory under examination can generate an apprecia-
tion of the tolerated attitudes. When tolerance is merely for-
bearance, liberalism is merely a call to tolerance without an
explanation or justification of why tolerance follows from a
deliberative structure. When liberal theory claims to tolerate
alternative attitudes better than non-liberal theories, it does so
by begging the question of which attitudes deserve toleration.
Why is liberalism more attractive than fascism? Because liber-
alism can tolerate more non-liberal attitudes than fascism can
tolerate nonfascist attitudes. If liberalism embraces the good of
the deliberative attitude, however, its capacity for explaining
and justifying toleration of non-liberal, dedicated cultures be-
comes problematic. Liberalism is then committed to a concep-
tion of the good that is antithetical to dedicated cultures.
2. Toleration as Appreciation and Respect
Toleration beyond a modus vivendi shows how an individual's
scheme of practical reasons can tolerate alternative schemes
based on the core element in her practical scheme. In order to
defend this proposition let us distinguish between three kinds
of tolerance. The first form of tolerance is appreciation. Al-
though I disagree with your radical political views, I nonethe-
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less recognize their force and commitment.'55 Because they
represent an alternative perspective on cultural conflicts and
cultural change, I appreciate how you value them. Your views
represent an alternative perspective, a different conception of
how to solve problems of a certain kind. I might even learn
something by considering them, though without endorsing them
or believing them to be true. 5 ' The basis for toleration in this
sense is the deliberative attitude. I recognize that your views
derive from a deliberative process that makes your view intelli-
gible to me, sometimes even plausible. I can perceive the delib-
erative process at work in the derivation of your views.
The second kind of tolerance is respect. I tolerate your views
not because I would ever consider them true or plausible, but
because I respect you. Although, I believe that your views are
totally false, I respect them because I can perceive their delib-
erative basis. The third sense of tolerance simply involves a
modus vivendi approach to a plurality of values. In this sense, I
need not appreciate nor respect your views; I simply permit
them because doing so brings about my independent goal of
living in a pluralist society. Were I to have my druthers, I
might act to repress the expression of your views or take more
aggressive action to prevent you from holding such views. 7
But since I have neither the power, nor perhaps the inclination
to do so, I ruefully permit their expression.
Joseph Raz captures this last sense of tolerance when he
observes that tolerance "implies the suppression or containment
of an inclination or desire to persecute, harass, harm or react
in an unwelcome way to a person."5 ' According to Raz's con-
ception, "a person is tolerant if and only if he suppresses a
155. Albert Weale, Toleration, Individual Differences and Respect for Persons, in
ASPECTS OF TOLERATION 16, 18 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1985) ("To be
tolerant involves the acceptance of differences that really matter to you.").
156. See ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (1989).
157. This attitude can be found in Hobbes' political philosophy and does not exact-
ly assume the moral high road, though it might occupy a morally middle ground
position. I might not appreciate nor respect your views, but I might believe that a
good society tolerates-in this modus vivendi sense-even unacceptable or despicable
views.
158. RAZ, supra note 78, at 401. But see Edward Sankowski, Personal Autonomy
Institutions, and Moral Philosophy, in PARADIGMS IN POLITICAL THEORY 34 (Steven J.
Gold ed., 1993).
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desire to cause to another a harm or hurt which he thinks the
other deserves."'59 Tolerance requires refraining from "an ac-
tivity likely to be unwelcome to its recipient, or of an inclina-
tion so to act which is in itself morally valuable and which is
based on a dislike or antagonism towards the person or a fea-
ture of his life, reflecting a judgment that these represent limi-
tations or deficiencies in him... .,1.0 Nevertheless, since in-
creased knowledge can also increase or encourage tolerance,
tolerance is more than just an inclination to curb morally op-
pressive views or limitations and deficiencies of character or
conduct. Tolerance occurs when we learn to appreciate or re-
spect someone's views after initially being inclined to suppress
them.'' True tolerance is more than a mere tight-faced accep-
tance of the obnoxious or outrageous; it is in part learning to
see the other person's life from her perspective, a coming to
understand what we still consider to be false, or morally wrong.
Learning to tolerate another's perspective in the sense of ap-
preciating it brings us close to, but does not compel, embracing
Pascal's "Tous comprendre est tous pardonner.""'5
159. RAZ, supra note 78, at 401-02.
160. Id. at 402.
161. Raz comes close to this conception in discussing multiculturalism. According to
Raz, "multiculturalism insists that members of different groups in a society should be
aware of the different cultures in their society, and learn to appreciate their
strengths and respect them." Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in
ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMiAN 155, 166 (1994). Raz probably would insist that appre-
ciating and respecting different cultures means considerably more than tolerating
them. In my view, we understand the moral psychology of toleration better, and how
it relates to pluralism, when we see it in terms of appreciation and respect, even
when what we tolerate-appreciate and respect-is antithetical to our conception of
the good. Perhaps there is less that separates Raz's view of tolerance and mine, since
Raz believes that "even when cultures are at fault, and certainly when they are infe-
rior without being oppressive, we have reason for supportive tolerance." Id. at 170.
Consider Raz's words:
People bred and socialized within such cultures often knew no better,
and had no choice. Moreover, by the time they are grown up their ability
to transplant themselves and become a part of another culture are limit-
ed .... Given that even oppressive cultures can give people quite a lot,
it follows one should be particularly wary of organized campaigns of as-
similation and discrimination against inferior and even oppressive cul-
tures. For many of their members they provide them with all that they
can have, as it may be too late for them to make a transition.
Id.
162. "To understand everything is to forgive everything."
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To summarize, I tolerate your views when I believe them to
be false, yet I appreciate their significance, respect their deriva-
tion, or permit you to utter them because suppressing them will
cause a greater harm. If I can learn to appreciate the signifi-
cance your views have for you and others, I can tolerate them
even if I still convey my disapproval. Similarly, if I cannot
appreciate their significance, I may still respect your right to
express views that I believe are morally pernicious. Tolerance is
thus a complex attitude that incorporates these and other fea-
tures of moral psychology and should not be viewed as limited
merely to the modus vivendi conception of tolerance. 6'
Liberalism cannot explain and justify toleration of dedicated
cultures in the first two senses; it cannot appreciate or respect
dedicated cultures." Since liberalism is committed to a delib-
erative strategy for resolving cultural conflicts and cultural
change, it cannot explain and justify appreciating or respecting
non-deliberated systems. In fact, dedicated cultures are in an
important sense unintelligible from a liberal perspective. They
can be described by liberalism, but explaining their deep struc-
ture is a non-starter for liberalism.'65
163. The attitudes of appreciating and respecting dedicated cultures are associated
with empathy and sympathy. Developing the capacity for sympathy is perhaps a
general way to come to. recognize diversity. Also, sympathy is related to tolerance in
that sympathy is likely to increase and deepen one's capacity for tolerance. In the
standard interpretation of Hume's ethics, sympathy plays a pivotal role as the empiri-
cally discoverable primary moral emotion. See generally DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds.,
1975); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed.
1965). But see Robert Justin Lipkin, Altruism and Sympathy in Hume's Ethics, 65
AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 18, 65 (1987) (interpreting Hume's conception of sympathy as
a necessary feature of moral personality). For a phenomenological account of sympa-
thy, see MAX SCHELER, THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY (Peter Heath, trans., 1970).
164. It might be argued that liberalism requires the existence of dedicated cultures
in order to provide individuals with a sufficiently wide array of different lifestyles
from which to exercise deliberative autonomy. Therefore, in the name of deliberative
autonomy, liberalism must tolerate dedicated cultures. But how can dedicated cultures
benefit liberal choice? If the values of the dedicated culture are truly dedicated and
therefore do not admit of a deliberative justification, they are irrelevant to liberal
reasoning. More importantly, even if successful, this objection explains liberal toler-
ance in the wrong way. Rather than appreciating or respecting dedicated cultures,
this objection contends that liberals should use such cultures as a means to benefit
liberal choice. If liberalism truly tolerated dedicated cultures, it must do so for the
benefit of the dedicated culture, not for the liberal's benefit.
165. Explaining and justifying the deep structure of dedicated cultures can only be
performed by non-deliberative factors.
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Some liberals may not care if liberalism fails to explain liber-
al toleration of dedicated cultures in the sense of appreciation
or respect, provided it can explain and justify tolerating dedi-
cated cultures as a modus vivendi.65 Both Rawls and Nagel,
however, reject the notion that tolerance should be understood
in modus vivendi sense."7 The reason for this rejection is that
such an accommodation appeals to instrumental, not intrinsic
values."c A modus vivendi approach depends on equal accessi-
bility to the means of power and domination. It implies that
other groups hold views which are not appreciated, nor respect-
ed, but instead are despised and feared. Further, the require-
ment of modus vivendi is not explained and justified by liberal-
ism, except in an ad hoc manner.
If liberalism is committed to either a conception of tolerance
as appreciation or of respect, the theory then explains and
justifies why one liberal culture should tolerate other liberal
cultures. Since liberalism involves a deliberative strategy of
cultural inquiry, all values, whatever their substantive dimen-
sion, should be appreciated or respected if they result from the
deliberative attitude. But this is precisely the sort of move
liberalism cannot make regarding dedicated cultures. A liberal
166. CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1988). Nevertheless, any
culture can explain toleration in this sense. Liberalism has nothing special to offer
here. See Cohen, supra note 134, at 1543.
167. If tolerating non-liberal cultures is possible at all, it consists of an ad hoc
compromise or accommodation between the liberal and non-liberal cultures following
no more strongly from liberalism than it follows from non-liberalism. In fact, promi-
nent liberals themselves have rejected such compromises as inconsistent with the
deep structure of liberal theory. For example, Rawls rejects the possibility of political
liberalism resting on "a mere modus vivendi, dependent on a fortuitous conjunction of
contingencies." John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. OF
LEGAL STUD., 1 (1987); RAWLS, supra note 116, at 47-48 (arguing that the modus
vivendi approach is inherently unstable).
Nagel also argues against a modus vivendi approach because:
[A] defense of toleration as a modus vivendi can be offered to hdlders of
radically divergent moral and political positions, but it is an instrumental
argument, and does not present higher-order impartiality in the political
sphere as a value in itself. It could not therefore be offered as a reason
for toleration to those who felt certain that their domination of the soci-
ety was completely secure.
NAGEL, supra note 133, at 157.
168. Moreover, if we understand toleration as a modus vivendi, we cannot offer the
appropriate assurances to minorities having only a weak position in the accommoda-
tion.
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culture cannot appreciate or respect dedicated cultures, not
merely because its values may not be liberal, but more impor-
tantly because the process for deriving or discovering these
values does not admit deliberative justification. Consequently, if
liberalism is committed to only a modus vivendi conception of
tolerance, it cannot explain and justify liberal toleration of oth-
er cultures in a conceptually and morally significant fash-
ion.'69  Only appreciation or respect can provide liberal
grounds for tolerance, and these grounds are unavailable to the
liberal perspective on dedicated cultures.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let us draw together the threads of this discussion. My query
has been whether liberalism can explain and justify tolerating
non-liberal cultures. In raising this question, I have assumed
that liberalism can explain and justify tolerating liberal cul-
tures, though I have not argued for this position; nor do I think
that the answer is transparent. Liberalism can explain and
justify liberal cultures engaging in dialogue and conversation,
but it does not follow that every liberal culture will tolerate
every other liberal culture. In some cases, we can imagine two
cultures, both committed to the deliberative attitude, disagree-
ing, even stridently, over the different substantive values each
embraces. We can imagine, in the limiting case, the differences
being so stark that these liberal cultures turn to war to resolve
the conflict. However, such conflict rarely occurs. 7 ° Typically,
since both cultures embrace the deliberative attitude, each
should appreciate, or at least respect, the commitments of the
deliberative process. Of course, the result might be different in
circumstances in which the material conditions of each culture
are so vastly different as to generate radically different sub-
stantive choices. Given similar circumstances, the deliberative
attitude should not generate vastly different substantive values.
The real question is, of course, the possibility of liberalism
explaining and justifying the toleration of non-liberal cultures. I
169. One feature of almost every significant conception of tolerance is mutuality or
reciprocity.
170. See Doyle, supra note 24 (arguing that this rarely occurs).
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have argued that this question can only be resolved after appre-
ciating the distinction between deliberative and dedicated cul-
tural constructs. Liberalism embraces deliberative constructs.
The more liberal the culture, the more comprehensive its appli-
cation of the deliberative attitude as a strategy for resolving
conflicts and for cultural change. Since a deliberative construct
is at the heart of both liberalism's theory of the right and its
theory of the good, liberalism cannot explain and justify tolerat-
ing dedicated cultures in the sense of appreciating or respecting
their values. It can, however, as any theory can, explain and
justify tolerating dedicated cultures in the modus vivendi sense.
Consequently, we must rethink liberalism's compatibility with
multicultural constitutionalism both in domestic contexts and in
foreign affairs.1 7' At best, liberalism can justify multicultural
constitutionalism as an accommodation or compromise. At
worst, liberalism is incompatible with dedicated cultures be-
cause its commitment to the deliberative attitude inclines it to-
ward justifying dedicated cultures only in deliberative terms.
This creates a tendency to interpret and justify dedicated cul-
tures in terms not shared by the members of the given culture,
resulting in distortion of the culture and condescension towards
it members. When tolerance is unlikely, liberalism is inclined
towards reforming or eliminating dedicated cultures in its drive
to become the culture of cultures.'72
171. In correspondence Edward Sankowski points out that my worries are really
over the compatibility of certain forms of liberalism and certain kinds of minority
cultures, not liberalism and minority cultures or multiculturalism generally. I would
put this point differently. The compatibility of liberalism and multiculturalism rests
on whether deliberative cultures can tolerate dedicated cultures. If liberalism can
tolerate only some forms of dedicated cultures, we must understand why, and we
must be suspicious of conceptions of liberalism such as Rawls' that seem to stack the
deck in favor of the deliberative process.
172. One such account of liberalism as the culture of cultures is revealed in the
following:
[W]e should always maintain only a contingent and never a constitutive
allegiance to any substantial view of the good life, that is, to any con-
crete way of life involving a specific structure of purposes, significances,
and activities (e.g. the life devoted to art, or to a career, or to a particu-
lar religion). Such forms of life can be truly valuable . . . only if they
are chosen from a position of critical attachment, in something like an
experimental spirit. The source of value, and so the supreme value, is
what is expressed in this posture of choice[.]
Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 343 (1990).
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